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Since the Kosovo intervention of the late 1990s, many
international lawyers and President Obama himself have argued
in support of a "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), an international
law doctrine that would permit collective humanitarian
intervention to prevent or mitigate extreme human rights
disasters. But even after the Arab Awakening and the ongoing
crises in Libya and Syria, there has been no thoroughgoing
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discussion of the circumstances under which such an intervention
would be lawful under international and U.S. domestic law. This
Frankel Lecture argues that we have reached a moment for
thoughtful re-examination of these critical legal issues. It reviews
the recent history of the war powers and humanitarian
intervention and suggests legal standards that should be applied
to govern the initiation and continuation of humanitarian
intervention under both international and United States law.
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I am honored to return to this podium, where I delivered the
4th Frankel Lecture seventeen years ago. Back then, when I told
my small children that I was going to Houston, they asked, "Why?
Do we have a problem?" On reflection, my answer for both Frankel
Lectures has been "yes."
I. THE PROBLEM
In 1998, the topic of my Frankel Lecture was "Bringing
International Law Home," with commentary by Harvard
political scientist Bob Keohane and NYU Law Professor Tom
Franck.' In returning this time, my goal has been to engage
again with the Law Review students, faculty, and my
commentators and friends Ashley Deeks and Dawn Johnsen, in
1. See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623
(1998).
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an effort to solve a different hard problem: the War Powers and
Humanitarian Intervention.
I have now spent thirty-five years as an international law
professor and scholar, twenty years as a human rights lawyer, ten
years in the U.S. government, and five years as a Dean. My topic
today grows out of all those experiences, lying particularly at the
intersection of three strands of my academic work. In my first
Frankel Lecture, I argued that "transnational legal process"-a
complex blend of interactions, interpretations, and
norm-internalizations-can act as a powerful engine for promoting
compliance with international law. Those of you who do not smoke,
who recycle plastics, snap in seat belts, or don bicycle helmets all
understand intuitively that most compliance with legal rules
follows not from compulsion, but obedience, 2 and that much
obedience comes from participating in a legal process that has the
effect of internalizing and habituating external norms into your
closely held value set.3 In my first Frankel Lecture, I argued that
for the same reason, nations obey international law: because this
transnational legal process causes those international norms to
become internalized, by "bringing international law home" into
domestic practice. The lecture asked and answered the question of
who are the "agents of internalization": i.e., the global actors who
drive this norm-internalization process?
In a second scholarly strand, I have focused on the role of the
United States as a prime shaper of international legal rules,
particularly through the much-discussed, too often-pejorative
notion of American Exceptionalism. 4 America's history reveals
both a Jekyll and Hyde face toward global human rights. While a
troubling, recurrent U.S. impulse toward negative exceptionalism
presses for double standards, with the United States on the lower
rung, a more powerful U.S. impulse toward positive
exceptionalism acknowledges and effectuates America's desire to
offer unique and exceptional global human rights leadership.
Thus, one of our central foreign policy challenges is how best to
promote and harness positive U.S. exceptionalism to produce
human rights improvements, while keeping negative
exceptionalism within "the margin of appreciation."
2. Cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2d ed. 2006) (arguing that
people obey the law because they believe it is legitimate, not because they fear coercion or
punishment).
3. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is lnternational Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397 (1999).
4. Harold Hongju Koh, America's Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 111 (Michael Ignatieffed., 2005); Harold Hongju Koh,
On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003).
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Third, under domestic law, my preoccupation for the past
quarter-century has been with "The National Security
Constitution": the legal framework within which our foreign and
national security policy transpires, based on the Constitution,
quasi-constitutional custom, international law, statutes, and
judicial and executive decisions.5 I believe that our current
political system gives the President incentives to overreach,
Congress incentives to acquiesce, and the courts incentives to
defer. For that reason, throughout our history, the pendulum
has swung back and forth between two competing constitutional
visions of foreign affairs power-a notion of shared power that
I favor, captured by Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,6
and the counter notion of unilateral executive discretion,
fostered by United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.7 In
balancing those visions, our challenges are multiplied by the
fact that we no longer live in a post-Cold War world. Instead, we
inhabit a "post-post-Cold War" world, after the fall of both the
Berlin Wall and the Twin Towers, characterized by
transnational decision-makers and transnational threats: an
increasingly "flat" age of globalization with myriad
transnational actors-intergovernmental and nongovernment
organizations, and individuals armed with computers or
weapons of mass destruction. To make matters worse, we are
living through a uniquely toxic U.S. domestic political
environment, where interbranch cooperation has been almost
entirely stalemated. As our external challenges and global
responsibilities multiply, straining our internal capacities, how
can we sustain in practice our preferred constitutional vision of
shared power?
This Lecture on the War Powers and Humanitarian
Intervention touches all three themes: transnational legal process,
positive American exceptionalism, and the National Security
Constitution. While staying true to the National Security
Constitution, how can we support the progressive development of
international law by promoting a norm of humanitarian
intervention that our country can internalize in a way that spurs
the positive face of American Exceptionalism? In this Frankel
Lecture, I argue that the United States can internalize rigorous
international law rules to guide lawful humanitarian intervention,
in a way that promotes exceptional American leadership in human
5. See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
6. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
7. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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rights, while adhering to the constitutional ground rules that
govern the war powers.
By so saying, I illustrate just one face of a broader academic
project, recently laid out in my 2014 Clarendon Law Lectures at
Oxford University.8 In those lectures, which addressed the broad
and multifaceted challenges of law and globalization, I argued for
a twenty-first century Global Legal Strategy that I call
"International Law as Smart Power."9 Without fully explicating
that strategy here, the heart of the approach is Engage-
Translate-Leverage. I argue that the United States should
Engage globally around its core values; Translate, in the sense of
rejecting "legal black holes" and applying the "Spirit of the Laws"
from twentieth century laws to meet emerging twenty-first
century challenges; and Leverage, blending law with other tools-
such as military force, diplomacy, development, technology,
markets, and international institutions-to achieve superior
foreign policy outcomes. During their times in office, President
Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attempted
to apply this strategy across a wide range of issue areas,
including the Arab Awakening, Human Rights, Cyberconflict,
International Criminal Justice, Immunities, Private
International Law, Consular Affairs, the Law of Natural
Disasters, and most relevant to today's discussion, Humanitarian
Intervention.
In this Lecture, let me illustrate how this "smart power"
approach plays out with respect to humanitarian intervention.
At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, the international law rules
for using force seemed pretty clear. One state could lawfully
breach another's territorial sovereignty only if one or more of
three conditions were obtained: response to aggression,
self-defense, or an explicit U.N. Security Council resolution. The
1991 Gulf War epitomized all three: The United States led a
coalition authorized by a U.N. Security Council resolution to
respond to Saddam Hussein's aggression to come to the defense
of Kuwait. But the question lingered: When may force be used to
protect human rights or prevent humanitarian disasters without
a Security Council resolution (the doctrine of "humanitarian
intervention")?
8. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, ON LAW AND GLOBALIZATION (forthcoming Oxford
Univ. Press 2017) (based on 2014 Oxford University Clarendon Law Lectures).
9. I expanded on these ideas in a series of lectures entitled "International Law as
Smart Power." Those lectures, given during the spring of 2013 at Oxford University as the
Visiting Oliver Smithies Lecturer at Balliol College, Oxford, are folded into the book
described in supra note 8.
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In recent decades, the ancient concept of humanitarian
intervention-which has been with us at least since Grotiuso0 -
has evolved into an emerging international law notion of
"Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). The idea of R2P suggests that
under international law, human rights-respecting countries have
a legal responsibility to take action, which under certain extreme
and limited circumstances can justify their intervening abroad to
prevent needless civilian slaughter. This Lecture asks: How can
we reconcile the tension between this humanitarian impulse and
the legal constraints imposed by current rules of U.S. and
international law?
II. THREE CASE STUDIES
Let me review three historical cases-Kosovo, Libya, and
Syria-with each of which I was personally involved.
A. Kosovo
The first was Kosovo, which I lived through during the
Clinton Administration as Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor under Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright. In 1999, Slobodan Milogevid, Serbia's
President, ordered his forces to begin attacking the citizens of the
breakaway republic of Kosovo. A Russian veto rendered
unobtainable the first-best option, a Security Council resolution.
After intense deliberation, nineteen NATO countries chose to use
force without Security Council authorization for humanitarian
purposes for seventy-eight days to prevent those abuses from
occurring. In the end, they succeeded. Milogevi6 was driven back,
later deposed, and ended up dying during his trial before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the
Hague."
During Kosovo, I watched as nineteen NATO members
accepted the legality of some form of humanitarian intervention
without U.N. Security Council approval. In October 1998, the
United Kingdom publicly declared the legality of the operation, so
long as the proposed use of process is "necessary and proportionate
to the [humanitarian] aim" and "is strictly limited in time and
10. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS 584 (Carnegie ed., Francis W. Kelsey
trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1925) (1625) ("I may make war upon one who is not one of
my people but oppresses his own, . . . a procedure which is often connected with the
protection of innocent persons.").
11. Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-01-50-I, Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the




scope to this aim." 1 2 Seventeen other NATO members individually
satisfied themselves of the legality of their participation in the
operation. 13 But curiously, the U.S. government never articulated
a clear legal justification condoning its NATO actions, instead
relying upon an amorphous listing of factors that together justified
the intervention as a matter of policy.14
Some threw up their hands and simply argued that the use of
force was "illegal but legitimate."5 And then-Secretary-General
Kofi Annan captured the United Nations' ambiguity about a
narrowly tailored form of humanitarian intervention in situations
of great extremis by issuing a statement recognizing that there
might be occasions where force might be necessary to serve
humanitarian purposes. By so doing, he helped catalyze the
ongoing international legal movement to explore whether there is
an international Responsibility to Protect.16
At the time, I was acting not as a government lawyer, but as a
human rights policy official within the U.S. government. I thought
it outrageous that the U.S. government would fail to state a legal
rationale to justify its use of force. Is there any other circumstance
where in seeking social change, we do not try to legalize the conduct
in which we think we are allowed to engage? Particularly in human
rights situations, don't we invariably strive to state the rules and
principles that make that conduct lawful? If, for example, we think
same-sex marriage is appropriate, do we say "it's illegal but
legitimate"? So as early as 1999, it seemed to me that we needed to
have a clearer understanding and explanation of the international
lawfulness of modern humanitarian intervention.
Under domestic law, questions about the legality of the
Kosovo operation reduced to two: a constitutional question
12. UK FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FRY/Kosovo: THE WAY AHEAD; UK
VIEW ON THE LEGAL BASE FOR USE OF FORCE (1998), quoted in Adam Roberts, NATO's
'Humanitarian War'over Kosovo, SURVIVAL, Autumn 1999, at 102, 106.
13. See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Serb. v. Belg.), Verbatim Record (May 10, 1999,
3 p.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf (arguing that NATO's use of force
was lawful). See generally Roberts, supra note 12, at 104.
14. See Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo, 94
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 301 (2000).
15. See INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT 4 (2000),
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC 1256989005CD
392-thekosovoreport.pdf; see also Matheson, supra note 14, at 301 (Michael J. Matheson,
the Acting Legal Adviser to the State Department, described the NATO justification as "a
pragmatic . . . basis for moving forward without establishing new doctrines or precedents
that might trouble individual NATO members or later haunt the Alliance if misused by
others").
16. See Chelsea O'Donnell, Note, The Development of the Responsibility to Protect: An
Examination of the Debate over the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 24 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 557, 560-63 (2014).
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about the initiation of conflict; and a statutory question about
the continuation of conflict. On the constitutional, initiation
issue, the question was: "For purposes of Article I of the
Constitution, is this 'war?"' On the statutory, continuation
issue, the question was: "For purposes of the War Powers
Resolution, are these 'hostilities?"'
As a constitutional matter, Congress has exclusive power to
declare war, but if a use of force entails something less than "war,"
the President can initiate it without prior congressional approval.
During the Clinton Administration, Walter Dellinger,
then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel,
opined that the President may initiate a lawful use of force if he
cites a compelling national interest and indicates that the "nature,
scope, and duration" of the action demonstrates that he is not taking
the country to a "war" that requires prior congressional approval.' 7
As a historical matter, I would argue that Congress has largely
acquiesced in this interpretation, which has led us to the position
where prior congressional approval is required to initiate large scale
foreign conflicts like Iraq in 2003, but not to initiate a more limited
intervention of constrained nature, scope, and duration.
Once military intervention has begun, the War Powers
Resolution (WPR) moves to the foreground, and the statutory
question becomes: "Are we in 'hostilities?"' Enacted in 1973 over a
presidential veto,' 8 the WPR imposes consultation and reporting
requirements and a sixty-day time limit (extendable under certain
conditions) upon the President's commitment of troops overseas
without express congressional authorization.19 The statute is
triggered by the introduction of "United States Armed Forces" into
the airspace and territory of a foreign country, but the durational
limit applies only if they are in "hostilities or . . . imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances." 20 The question in Kosovo was whether the U.S.
government was required to comply with the statutory durational
17. Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173 (1994)
[hereinafter Dellinger Opinion). In her response in this Symposium, Professor Johnsen
reaffirms that she and I "both endorse the constitutional framework used by Presidents
Clinton and Obama respecting the initiation of the use of military force, which looks to the
'nature, scope, and duration' of a military deployment to determine if congressional
authorization is constitutionally required." Dawn Johnsen, When Responsibilities Collide:
Humanitarian Intervention, Shared War Powers, and the Rule of Law, 53 HOUS. L. REV.
1065, 1073 (2016).
18. See Veto of War Powers Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1285, 1285-86
(Oct. 24, 1973).
19. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2012)).
20. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
978 [53:4
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
limit of sixty days (or in case of unavoidable military necessity,
ninety days) after the bombing began.
As I recall, in Kosovo, at the sixty-day mark, there was little
doubt within the U.S. government that we were in a state of
"hostilities." But the policy determination was: we're almost
there; we're not going to stop and allow Milogevi6 to regain
traction, particularly given that the sixty-day statutory limit
had been arbitrarily chosen without this particular scenario in
mind some twenty-five years earlier. So the Clinton
Administration continued with bombing that seemed clearly to
exceed the level of "hostilities." Shortly before the sixty-day
mark, Congress passed a budget bill appropriating money for
the military operation; at seventy-eight days Milogevid
conceded. At the end of 2000, the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel issued a detailed opinion that treated the
emergency supplemental appropriation for military operations
as "authorization for continuing hostilities after the expiration
of sixty days" under the WPR, reasoning that the statute did not
bar Congress from authorizing military operations through an
appropriations measure, "but instead has the effect of
establishing a background principle against which to interpret
later Acts of Congress." 21 OLC's 2000 opinion has subsequently
been cited as domestic law precedent for how, despite the
express language of the War Powers Resolution, the Executive
can rely on a "background principle" to justify continuing a
humanitarian intervention past sixty days.
Under international law, however, the Clinton
Administration never followed the British government in issuing
an opinion explaining why its actions complied with international
21. Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 339 (2000).
The OLC Memo's conclusion was surprising because the WPR would seem to bar reliance
on the emergency supplemental, inasmuch as it expressly states:
Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before November 7, 1973),
including any provision contained in any appropriations Act, unless such
provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this chapter.
Id. at 330-31 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §§ 1547(a)(1)). The OLC Memo reasoned, however, that
the Congress that enacted the emergency supplemental (1) could not constitutionally be
bound by the terms of the earlier statute and (2) that the legislative history of the
supplemental sustained the inference that Congress implicitly meant, in appropriating the
funds President Clinton had requested, to provide the legal authority for the operation he
intended to pursue. Id. at 340-58.
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law. 22 As I have argued elsewhere, I consider the Clinton
Administration's failure to articulate a clear international legal
rationale for its Kosovo intervention to be a violation of its Duty to
Explain, which would come back to haunt the Obama
Administration with regard to Syria fourteen years later. 23
Professor Johnsen "agree[s] that the Executive Branch bears
a responsibility to provide a public explanation for such
controversial and consequential action."24 Yet she disagrees that it
is always better to legalize the conduct undertaken, reasoning that
the principle will (in Justice Jackson's unforgettable phrase) lie
about like a "loaded weapon" ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. In the
next breath, she argues that "the lack of public
explanation . . . greatly undermin[es] any precedential value of
this intervention." 25 Yet what gives an incident precedential value
is that it happened and that the state (here the United States)
maintained that it was acting lawfully, thus making it a matter of
state practice for international law and a matter of executive
practice for domestic law. For that reason, Kosovo is frequently
cited as precedent by countries-such as the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Belgium-that have publicly explained their
support for the legality of humanitarian intervention.
B. Libya
This brings me to our second case: Libya in 2011. During his first
year in office, President Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize. Little
noticed in his December 2009 acceptance speech was this
unambiguous statement: "I believe that force can be justified on
humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that
have been scarred by war."26 By so saying, the President signaled early
that, under appropriate circumstances, he was prepared to act to
prevent civilian slaughter in a future Kosovo or Rwanda situation.
But suddenly and unexpectedly, starting in 2010, we
witnessed an extraordinary, tumultuous region-wide Arab
22. See generally Matheson, supra note 14. As Professor Deeks notes, one could
extrapolate a legal test from the Kosovo factors that would have both authorized and
limited the precedential value of that precedent. See Ashley Deeks, Multi-Part Tests in the
Jus Ad Bellum, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1035, 1060 (2016).
23. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Adviser's Duty to Explain, 41 YALE
J. INT'L L. 189 (2016).
24. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1093.
25. Id. at 1093-94.
26. Remarks on Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1799, 1801




Awakening.27 Across the Arab region, authoritarian governments
were collapsing, and popular movements were springing up and
communicating with the world on social media. But what happens
when Arab Awakening meets Responsibility to Protect? That
question hit me hard as Legal Adviser to the State Department
when we were advised that Libya's dictator, Muammar Qadhafi,
would attack and destroy the stronghold of his opposition, located
in Benghazi.
Qadhafi had already graphically demonstrated his ongoing
intent to suppress the democratic movement against him by
lawlessly attacking Libyan civilians. On February 22, 2011,
Qadhafi pledged on Libyan National Television to lead "millions to
purge Libya inch by inch, house by house, household by household,
alley by alley, and individual by individual until I purify this
land."2 8 He called his opponents "rats" and announced that they
would all be executed.29 Less than a month later, in another
televised address, Qadhafi promised, "We will come house by
house, room by room... . We will find you in your closets. And we
will have no mercy and no pity." 30 We had little doubt that this
was not just rhetorical bombast; defecting Qadhafi forces
recounted rules of engagement ordering them to "show no mercy"
to prisoners, and reports indicated that Qadhafi's forces were
using rape as a tool of war.31 For all of these reasons, President
Obama decided that the United States would engage in military
actions with other NATO countries aimed at preventing an
imminent humanitarian disaster.
Starting in late March 2011, the United States joined with the
Arab League and NATO allies to secure two Security Council
resolutions to enforce a no-fly zone and arms embargo, along with
asset freezes, diplomatic engagement, a travel ban, and referral
for accountability to the International Criminal Court, all with the
goal of protecting civilians. 32 In late March 2011, President Obama
27. See Tethered by History, ECONOMIST (July 5, 2014), http://www.economist.com
/news/briefing/21606286-failures-arab-spring-were-long-time-making-tethered-history.
28. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
112th Cong. 7, 11 n.5 (2011) [hereinafter Koh Libya Testimony] (Statement of Harold
Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
29. Id. at 12 n.5.
30. Id.
31. Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, Sexual
Violence in Libya, the Middle East and North Africa (June 16, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/ 2 011/06/166369.htm; 'This Week'
Transcript: Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates and Donald Rumsfeld, ABC NEWS (Mar. 27,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-hillary-clinton-robert-gates
-donald-rumsfeld/story?id=13232096.
32. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
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declared, "[W]hen someone like Qadhafi threatens a bloodbath
that could destabilize an entire region, and when the international
community is prepared to come together to save many thousands
of lives, then it's in our national interest to act. And it's our
responsibility." 33
By so saying, the United States asserted not just that
preventing the slaughter of Libyan civilians was a compelling
national interest, but also-in a claim then embedded into two
Security Council resolutions-that Qadhafi had forfeited his
responsibility to protect Libyan citizens, implicitly inviting the
United Nations to act. Applying the Dellinger test, the Office of
Legal Counsel stated first orally, then in a written opinion by
then-Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel Caroline Krass, that because the use of force
contemplated was limited in nature, scope, and duration, it did not
constitute a "war" in a constitutional sense, that requires prior
congressional approval. 34
In the first few weeks after military action began, the United
States established a no-fly zone, and neither the House nor the
Senate took contrary action. The United States took the lead among
the NATO nations in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, which
required extensive bombing at the front end, a task that called upon
the United States' unique military capabilities. But what President
Obama made clear from the outset was that once the no-fly zone was
established, the United States would shift to a backup role,
supporting no-fly zone patrols by other NATO countries primarily
through refueling and aerial reconnaissance activities.35
Too often overlooked now, amid the confusion that currently
reigns in Libya, is that the joint NATO action succeeded in its goal
33. The President's Weekly Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 293, 293 (Mar. 26, 2011),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2011-bookl/pdf/PPP-2011-bookl-Doc-pg293.pdf.
34. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Libya OLC Opinion]. Professor Johnsen mentions "four contested aspects of [OLC's] Libya
opinion that may be particularly relevant to future humanitarian interventions." First, that
the intervention was nonconsensual by Qadhafi (although it was plainly welcomed by the
Libyan opposition, who the United States and others had recognized as the legitimate
representative of the Libyan people); second, that the Opinion did not rely solely upon a
humanitarian interest (although as I have noted above, the Security Council resolution
which the United States was enforcing expressly stated that Qadhafi had forfeited his
responsibility to protect his own citizens); third, that Congress had not acquiesced in Kosovo
(even though the 2000 OLC opinion rests on the notion that Congress implicitly authorized
the action by its appropriation measure before the sixtieth day); and fourth, that the Libya
opinion "focuse[d] on the risk only to American troops," when in fact the entire purpose of
the operation was to save the lives of thousands of Libyan civilians from illegal attacks by
Qadhafi's soldiers. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1094-96.




of protecting Libyan civilians. The slaughter of Benghazi was
averted; untold thousands of Libyan civilian lives were saved; and
although Qadhafi's overthrow was not the stated goal of the joint
NATO operation, he vacated office and went into hiding,
eventually to be captured and killed. 36 All of this was brought
home to me not long after Qadhafi fell, when I traveled with
Secretary Clinton to a free Libya and visited what had been called
"Qadhafi University," now renamed "University of Tripoli."
Everywhere in the aftermath you could see drawings and pictures
expressing the students' delight about Qadhafi's fall. As we walked
through the jubilant campus, I was shocked to see gallows and to
learn that during the Qadhafi era, protesting students had been
publicly hung on the campus for having protested against the
government.
As we approached Day Sixty after the bombing began, an
intense debate ensued inside the Beltway. Some suggested that at
the Sixty Day mark, we would only have three options. Option
One, we could just stop: if so, the widespread prediction was that
Qadhafi and his forces would recover, creating a real chance that
the slaughter would resume, an option that most in the
Administration deemed unacceptable. A second possibility was to
ask Congress to pass authorizing legislation, which of course was
everybody's first preference. But quiet inquiry revealed that too
many members of Congress who had felt politically burned by
their votes on the 2003 Iraq War were reluctant to have to vote on
war again. Accordingly, the leadership in Congress made clear
that they would not pass legislation, expressing in every
conceivable way that they wanted no votes.37 Thus Option Two-
36. Mary Beth Sheridan, Moammar Gaddafi Killed in Rebel Custody as Last Loyalist
Holdout in Libya Falls, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/middle-east/gaddafis-home-town-overrun-conflicting-reports-on-his-fate/2011/10/20
/gIQAMwTBOL.story.html.
37. Charlie Savage of the New York Times later reported that around Day
Fifty-Seven,
[The message came back that there was no political appetite to enact an
authorization.... McCain and Kerry, seeing that there was no chance of getting
a resolution through the House anyway, had shelved their plans to push one in
the Senate. . . . [T]here was a widespread understanding within the Obama
administration that congressional leaders of both parties in each chamber had
separately and privately told the president that they did not think authorization
was legally necessary.
CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 641, 643 (2015)
[hereinafter SAVAGE, POWER WARS]. As I later noted in my Senate testimony,
[F]ew Members of Congress asserted that our participation in the NATO mission
would trigger or had triggered the War Powers Resolution's pullout provision.
House Speaker [John] Boehner stated on June 1, 2011, that "[1legally, [the
Administration has] met the requirements of the War Powers Act." House
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seeking legislation-effectively reduced to Option One: doing
nothing, and letting the slaughter of civilians resume. Yet a third
option was presented by Senator John McCain and his
congressional allies, who argued that the President should simply
declare the War Powers Resolution unconstitutional and force a
showdown with Congress over that long-contested legal issue.38
But while we were centrally focused on averting civilian slaughter
in Benghazi, creating a second, constitutional battleground by
forcing an interbranch confrontation over the separation of powers
was the last thing anyone wanted to do. We had to ask whether
these were really the only available options: stop and permit
slaughter or force a constitutional confrontation? 39
Minority Leader [Nancy] Pelosi stated on June 16, 2011, that "[t]he limited nature
of this engagement allows the President to go forward," as "the President has the
authority he needs." Senate Majority Leader [Harry] Reid stated on June 17,
2011, that "[t]he War Powers Act has no application to what's going on in Libya."
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman [John] Kerry stated on June 21,
2011, that "I do not think our limited involvement rises to the level of hostilities
defined by the War Powers Resolution," and on June 23, 2011, that "[w]e have not
introduced our armed forces into hostilities. No American is being shot at. No
American troop is at risk of being shot down today. That is not what we're doing.
We are refueling. We are supporting NATO."
Koh Libya Testimony, supra note 28, at 13 n.8. Savage reports that the current Senate
Majority Leader, Republican Mitch McConnell, also made public comments suggesting that
he did not think the Administration was violating the War Powers Resolution. SAVAGE,
POWER WARS, supra, at 643.
38. Tom Cohen, Key Senate Republicans Disagree with House GOP on War Powers
Debate, CNN (June 19, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/19
/war.powers/. There is a continuing, intense debate over whether and to what extent past
presidents have considered the War Powers Resolution's sixty-day clock to be
unconstitutional. In 1980, the Carter Justice Department stated that "[w]e believe that
Congress may, as a general constitutional matter, place a 60-day limit on the use of our
armed forces as required by the provisions of [section 5(b)] of the Resolution." See
Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A
Op. O.L.C. 185 (1980), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1980/02
/31/op-olc-v004a-p0185_0.pdf. Republican administrations have tended to take the opposite
view, but the precise extent to which they have done so has been debated. See generally
Charlie Savage, Republicans and the Myth that Every President Since Nixon Has Declared
the War Powers Resolution's 60-Day Clock to Be Unconstitutional (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.charliesavage.com/?p=686; Charlie Savage, More on My Discussion with
Stephen Griffin on Republicans and the Myth that Every President Since Nixon Has
Declared the War Powers Resolution's 60-Day Clock to Be Unconstitutional (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.charliesavage.com/?page-id=37.
39. As noted below, Charlie Savage argued that yet another option was to reduce
"military activity . . . to a purely supporting role, like refueling allied warplanes and
providing surveillance." Significantly, the U.S. military disfavored that option (although
put forward by the Defense Department's own lawyer) because it would create an
unacceptable operational risk: that "[w]ithout the availability of the United States' unique
weapons systems, the risk would go up that pro-Gadhafi forces would shoot down a NATO
aircraft" and that NATO would be barred from using its Predator drones to strike at
Qadhafi forces seeking to exploit chemical weapons depots. SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra
note 37, at 643-44.
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This was neither a theoretical nor an academic question. I was
Legal Adviser for the State Department, and thousands of lives
would be affected by our legal answer. I recalled that when the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis first broke,40 and U.S. overflights
observed Soviet missiles inside Cuba, three unpalatable policy
options were initially presented for presidential decision: (1) do
nothing, (2) undertake a ground invasion (which was both illegal
and politically controversial after the disastrous Bay of Pigs
fiasco), or (3) launch a unilateral military strike. Through
intensive consultation with senior policymakers through the
so-called "ExComm process," then-State Department Legal
Adviser and Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes, his Deputy
Leonard Meeker, and Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel Norbert Schlei helped formulate a fourth option: a
defensive "quarantine" approved by the Organization of American
States (OAS). 41 Significantly, at the time, the defensive quarantine
option was roundly excoriated by legal scholars as a shadow
"blockade," which would have required Security Council approval
under Article 53 of the U.N. Charter.42 But Option Four-
defensive quarantine-facilitated a much better policy outcome in
the end. That option walked the fine line between doing nothing
and avoiding nuclear conflict, while spurring a supportive vote by
the OAS and back-channel negotiations that led to the ultimate
removal of the Soviet missiles in exchange for removal of American
Jupiter missiles in Turkey. After intense retrospective
examination over a half-century, Option Four has come to be seen
not only as a reasonable domestic and international legal
40. See generally ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL
CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW (1974).
41. See id. at 14-16 (discussing the legal debate around the "defensive quarantine"
concept).
42. See, e.g., Stephen R. Shalom, International Lawyers & Other Apologists: The Case
of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 12 POLITY 83, 87 (1979) ("The quarantine was a blockade in
everything but name. The evidence that this was so is overwhelming. White House adviser
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has written: 'since a blockade was technically an act of war, it was
thought better to refer to it as a quarantine."'). As a de facto blockade, the quarantine
appeared on its face to be an Article 42 measure, and thus an instance of "enforcement
action" envisioned by Article 53(1). See U.N. Charter art. 42 (Security Council may "take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security[, which] may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." (emphasis added));
John Halderman, Regional Enforcement Measures and the United Nations, 52 GEO. L.J. 89,
92 (1963) ("The Charter definition of 'enforcement action' is believed to be found in articles
1(1), 39, 41 and 42."); John Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546,
558-59 (1963) (arguing that the Cuban quarantine constituted an unauthorized
"enforcement action," violating the U.N. Charter requirement that "no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council" (quoting U.N. Charter art. 53)).
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interpretation, but also as a legal opinion that facilitated the best
available policy outcome.43
Thinking back on the Cuban Missile Crisis, I wondered: Was
there a better fourth option in Libya as well? As a legal matter,
there seemed to be consensus that the force actually being used
was so limited in nature, scope, and duration that it did not
constitute a "war" in a constitutional sense. Weren't we also
obligated to investigate whether the force actually being used was
so limited in nature, scope, and duration that it did not even
constitute "hostilities" in a statutory sense? If such facts existed,
couldn't we lawfully accept the constitutionality of the War Powers
Resolution but determine that we were not, in fact, in "hostilities"
that would trigger the sixty-day durational limit?
To answer that question required us to explore both a legal
question-what Congress intended "hostilities" to mean when it
enacted the War Powers Resolution-and a factual question:
how much military action was actually transpiring in Libya?
With regard to the first question, we discovered that the term
"hostilities" is hardly self-defining. As a federal judge had
observed, "fixed legal standards were deliberately omitted from
this statutory scheme," as "the very absence of a definitional
section in the [War Powers] Resolution [was] coupled with
debate suggesting that determinations of 'hostilities' were
intended to be political decisions made by the President and
Congress." 44 Almost the only relevant language from the
legislative history was found in the House report suggesting
that "[t]he word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed
conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it
was considered to be somewhat broader in scope," but the report
provided no clear direction on what either term was understood
to mean. 45 When the War Powers Resolution was first
considered, one of its principal sponsors, Senator Jacob K.
Javits, stated that "[t]he bill. . . seeks to proceed in the kind of
language which accepts a whole body of experience and
precedent without endeavoring specifically to define it."46 As
another witness testified, "there is peril in trying to be too exact
in definitions" as "[s]omething must be left to the judgment, the
43. See generally GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION:
EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971); ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A
MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1969).
44. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 341 n.53 (D.D.C. 1987).
45. H.R. REP. No. 93-287, at 7 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
46. War Powers Legislation: Hearings on S. 731, S.J. Res. 18, and S.J. Res. 59 Before
the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong. 28 (1971) (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits,
Member, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations).
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intelligence, the wisdom, of those in command of the Congress,
and of the President as well." 4 7
As a legal matter, I concluded that with respect to what
constitutes "hostilities," the War Powers Resolution was far less
clear than anyone wanted to acknowledge. Far from being black
and white, that term had been studied in the past by several legal
offices within the U.S. government-including the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel-but none had clarified
exactly what it meant. The Dellinger Test had specified a
three-factor "nature, scope, and duration" standard for what
constitutes "war," but Executive Branch lawyers had never
specified a similar test for what constitutes "hostilities."
Accordingly, with respect to the legal test for "hostilities," I
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
[A]s everyone recognizes, the legal trigger for the automatic
pullout clock, "hostilities" is an ambiguous term of art that is
defined nowhere in the statute. The legislative
history . . . makes clear there was no agreed-upon view of
exactly what the term "hostilities" would encompass, nor has
that standard ever been defined by any court or by Congress
itself. From the start, legislators disagreed about the meaning
of the term and the scope of the 60-day pullout rule and
whether a particular set of facts constitutes hostilities for
purposes of the resolution has been determined less by a
narrow parsing of dictionary definitions than by interbranch
practice. The Members of Congress who drafted the War
Powers Resolution understood that this resolution is not like
the Internal Revenue Code. Reading the War Powers
Resolution should not be a mechanical exercise. The term
"hostilities" was vague but they declined to give it more
concrete meaning in part to avoid hampering future Presidents
by making the resolution a one-size-fits-all straitjacket that
would operate mechanically without regard to the facts.48
Asked at a House of Representatives hearing whether the
term "hostilities" was problematic because of "the susceptibility of
it to different interpretations," making this "a very fuzzy area,"
Senator Javits had argued that this ambiguity was in fact a
necessary feature of the legislation: "There is no question about
that, but that decision would be for the President to make. No one
is trying to denude the President of authority."49
47. Id. (statement of Henry Steele Commager, Professor, Amherst College).
48. Koh Libya Testimony, supra note 28, at 8.
49. War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Natl Sec. Policy & Sci. Devs. of
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong. 22 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits,
Member, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations).
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Thus, successive administrations had invariably started from
the premise that the term "hostilities" is "definable in a
meaningful way only in the context of an actual set of facts."50 In
Libya, we confronted a most unusual confluence of facts. The
President had:
framed our military mission narrowly, directing, among other
things, that no ground troops would be deployed (except for
necessary personnel recovery missions), and that U.S. Armed
Forces would transition responsibility for leading and
conducting the mission to an integrated NATO command. On
April 4, 2011, U.S. forces did just that, shifting to a
constrained and supporting role in a multinational civilian
protection mission-in an action involving no U.S. ground
presence or, to this point, U.S. casualties-authorized by a
carefully tailored U.N. Security Council resolution.
By Presidential design, U.S. forces are playing a
constrained and supporting role in a NATO-led
multinational civilian protection operation, which is
implementing a U.N. Security Council resolution tailored to
that limited purpose. This is a very unusual set of
circumstances, not found in any of the historic situations in
which the "hostilities" question was previously debated,
from the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Lebanon,
Grenada, and El Salvador in the early 1980s, to the fighting
with Iran in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s, to the use
of ground troops in Somalia in 1993.51
In comparing Libya to some of the historic situations in which
the "hostilities" question had previously been debated, we found
that in Lebanon the White House had argued that U.S. armed forces
were not in "hostilities," although there were roughly 1,600 U.S.
Marines equipped for combat on a daily basis and roughly 2,000
more on ships and bases nearby; U.S. Marine positions were
attacked repeatedly; and four Marines were killed and several
dozen wounded in those attacks.5 2 In Grenada, the Reagan
50. See Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, and Martin R.
Hoffmann, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, H. Foreign
Affairs Comm. (June 3, 1975), reprinted in War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to
the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the
Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Sec. & Sci. Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong. 38 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Leigh-Hoffmann Letter].
51. Koh Libya Testimony, supra note 28, at 12, 14.
52. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41199, THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: AFTER THIRTY-SIX YEARS 13-15 (2010); John H. Kelly, Lebanon: 1982-1984,
in U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICYMAKING WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FORCE 85,96-99 (Jeremy
R. Azrael & Emil A. Payin eds., 1996).
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Administration did not acknowledge that statutory "hostilities" had
begun, even though 1,900 members of the U.S. armed forces had
landed on the island, leading to combat that claimed the lives of
nearly twenty Americans and wounded nearly 100 more.53 In the
Persian Gulf in 1987-1988, the Reagan Administration argued that
the War Powers Resolution's pullout provision was inapplicable to
a reflagging program that was preceded by an accidental attack on
a U.S. Navy ship that killed thirty-seven crewmen; and that led to
repeated instances of active combat with Iranian forces.5 4 And in
Somalia, the branches could not agree about when "hostilities"
began, even though, as part of Operation Restore Hope, 25,000
troops were initially dispatched by the President, without
congressional authorization, and by fall 1993, ground combat had
led to the deaths of more than two dozen U.S. soldiers.55
Even without accepting any of these past Executive Branch
positions as correct, one could conclude from these historical
precedents that the magnitude of the military engagement should
be relevant to determining whether or not the United States was
indeed in "hostilities" for purposes of the War Powers Resolution.
At that point, seeking the facts on the ground, we asked for a chart
showing the amount of bombing that had been going on in Libya
since the initiation of the use of force. The graph reproduced below
roughly replicates what we saw: it showed, on the x-axis, the
number of days from initiation of the use of force, and on the
Libya "Hostilities"
10 1 2.3440 0 7 8
Days from iation
53. See GRIMMETT, supra note 52, at 15; Ben Bradlee, Jr., A Chronology on Grenada,
BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1983, at 24.
54. See GRIMMETT, supra note 52, at 16-18.
55. See id. at 27; JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION
RESTORE HOPE: REFLECTIONS ON PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING 112, 124-27 (1995).
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y-axis-which measures the number of U.S. military strikes-the
relatively low level of U.S. bombing thereafter, as necessarily
dictated by the limited, supporting nature of the U.S. mission as
part of a multinational force in Libya.
As the graph shows, around Day Fifteen, the number of
strikes by U.S. forces dramatically dropped and stayed roughly at
that level until past Day Forty. But after command and control
of Libyan weapons were destroyed in the first ten to twelve days
to establish a no-fly zone, Qadhafi's forces replicated command
and control by putting laptops on jeeps and mobile platforms,
which were then "paired" by computer with standing
surface-to-air weapons. Those mobile platforms thus became
capable of operating the very same surface-to-air missiles that
had been initially immobilized by the first NATO strikes
conducted during the initial ten to twelve days of the Libyan
operation. Because precision-targeted U.S. drones were the only
available weapons that could eliminate those mobile platforms
with accuracy, an uptick in the number of U.S. strikes occurred
between roughly Day Forty and Day Fifty-five. Even so, as I later
testified, "American strikes have been limited on an as-needed
basis to the suppression of enemy air defenses to enforce the no-fly
zone and limited strikes by Predator unmanned aerial vehicles
against discrete targets to support the civilian protection
mission."56 "[T]he bulk of U.S. contributions has been providing
intelligence capabilities and refueling assets to the NATO effort,"
with 75% of the overall sorties being flown by our coalition
partners, and the overwhelming majority of strike sorties, 90%,
also being flown by our NATO partners.57 Perhaps most telling,
"[bly our best estimate, . . . since the handoff to NATO, the total
number of United States munitions dropped in Libya has been less
than 1 percent of those dropped in Kosovo."5 8
In short, the overall magnitude of military strikes in Libya
remained moderate. The statutory question was whether that
level of strikes, combined with other factors, exceeded the legal
standard for "hostilities." In his recent exhaustive account of this
period, Power Wars, New York Times reporter Charlie Savage
reported that the General Counsel of the Defense Department
circulated a discussion paper . . . saying that the
administration would have a stronger argument that it was
complying with the [WPR] if its military activity receded to
a purely supporting role, like refueling allied warplanes and
56. Koh Libya Testimony, supra note 28, at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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providing surveillance. That could mean no more American
missile strikes at air defenses and returning to the rule that
Predator drones were for surveillance only.5 9
Even if this policy option had not been rejected by the DOD
General Counsel's own clients,6 0 my legal question was: "Where
could this distinction be found in either the text or legislative
history of the War Powers Resolution?" Why, under this reading,
did the mere availability of missile and drone strikes against
revived mobile platforms-no matter what the magnitude of
actual strikes might be-suddenly transform the situation into
"hostilities," triggering the WPR's sixty-day durational limit? To
this day, I have been pointed to no authority that required that
legal conclusion.
So in the end, the question became highly fact-specific: If the
United States had no boots on the ground, ran no risk of escalation
because of the limited nature of the mission, flew almost
exclusively support missions, but did some precision bombing to
protect civilians-including making drones available not just for
surveillance, but also for attacking replicated mobile platforms-
did the totality of those activities constitute "hostilities" for
purposes of the War Powers Resolution? My position was that
under these circumstances we had a solid case that this situation
did not constitute statutory "hostilities." On this point, the
statute's text was not clear, but deliberately ambiguous, from the
passage of the War Powers Resolution to the present.
Significantly, the Supreme Court had recently directed that
when considering certain issues of statutory construction in
foreign affairs, one should focus not just on text, but on the "focus"
of congressional concern.6 ' Here, it seemed clear that the focus of
the War Powers Resolution was as a "No More Vietnams" statute,
not a "Let's Have More Rwandas" statute.62 Congress's focus was
on preventing large-scale creeping wars that build and escalate to
involve large numbers of ground troops. Congress's intent was not
59. SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 37, at 635-49 (emphasis added).
60. See supra note 39.
61. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
62. As President Obama later put it,
[W]hen you look at the history of the War Powers resolution, it came up after the
Vietnam War in which we had half a million soldiers there, tens of thousands of
lives lost, hundreds of billions of dollars spent, and Congress said, you know what,
we don't want something like that happening again. So if you're going to start
getting us into those kinds of commitments, you've got to consult with Congress
beforehand. And I think that such consultation is entirely appropriate.
The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 715, 718-19 (June 29, 2011),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2011-bookl/pdflPPP-201 1-bookl-Doc-pg715-2.pdf
[hereinafter President Barack Obama, June 29 Press Conference].
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to truncate U.N. -authorized humanitarian missions that had been
carefully designed to limit U.S. military engagement and prevent
both large-scale escalations and civilian slaughter.
This intuition seemed confirmed by a legal opinion issued just
two years after the War Powers Resolution was enacted, when
Congress had expressly invited the Executive Branch to provide
its best understanding of the term "hostilities." Then-Legal
Adviser Monroe Leigh and Defense Department General Counsel
Martin Hoffmann drew a distinction between full-scale military
encounters and "intermittent military engagements" that did not
require withdrawal of forces under the Resolution's sixty-day
rule. 6 3 As a general matter, they suggested the Executive Branch
understood "hostilities" "to mean a situation in which units of the
U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with
opposing units of hostile forces." 64 Hence, they concluded, the term
should not be read to include situations where the nature of the
mission is limited and does not "involve the full military
engagements with which the Resolution is primarily concerned." 65
Nor did "hostilities" contemplate situations where the exposure of
U.S. forces and the risk of escalation were limited, for example,
situations involving "sporadic military or paramilitary attacks on
our armed forces stationed abroad."66
Based on all of this analysis, I advised that under the
particular circumstances prevailing in Libya, it was lawful to
argue that the United States was not in "hostilities" for purposes
of the War Powers Resolution. As I later testified: "In light of this
historical practice, a combination of four factors present in Libya
suggests that the current situation does not constitute the kind of
'hostilities' envisioned by the War Powers Resolution's sixty-day
automatic pullout provision":
First, the nature of the mission is unusually limited. By
Presidential design, U.S. forces are playing a constrained
and supporting role in a NATO-led, multinational civilian
protection mission charged with enforcing a Security Council
63. See 1975 Leigh-Hoffman Letter, supra note 50, at 38-39; see also Letter from
Wendy R. Sherman, Assistant Sec'y of State for Legislative Affairs, to Rep. Benjamin
Gilman, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs (Sept. 28, 1993), reprinted in 139 Cong. Rec.
22,752-753 (1993) ("[N]o previous Administration has considered that intermittent
military engagements involving U.S. forces overseas, whether or not constituting
'hostilities,' would necessitate the withdrawal of such forces pursuant to section 5(b) of the
Resolution.").
64. See 1975 Leigh-Hoffman Letter, supra note 50, at 38-39.
65. Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory
Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 194 (1980), https://www.justice.gov/olclopinion
/presidential-power-use-armed-forces-abroad-without-statutory-authorization
66. Id.; 1975 Leigh-Hoffman Letter, supra note 50, at 38-39.
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resolution. .. . Second, the exposure of our Armed Forces is
limited. From the transition date of March 31 forward, there
have been no U.S. casualties, no threat of significant U.S.
casualties, no active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, no
significant armed confrontation or sustained confrontation of
any kind with hostile forces.. . . Third, the risk of escalation
here is limited. In contrast to the U.N.-authorized Desert
Storm operation, which presented over 400,000 troops, the
same order of magnitude as Vietnam at its peak, Libya has
not involved any significant chance of escalation into a full-
fledged conflict characterized by a large U.S. ground
presence, major casualties, sustained active combat, or an
expanding geographic scope. . . . And fourth and
finally, ... we are using limited military means, not the kind
of full military engagements with which the War Powers
Resolution is primarily concerned. . . . The violence U.S.
Armed Forces are directly inflicting or facilitating after the
handoff to NATO has been modest in terms of its frequency,
intensity, and severity.67
National Security Adviser Tom Donilon confirmed to Charlie
Savage that "the not-hostilities theory 'was on the table before the
decision' and so was not an after-the-fact rationalization." 68 By his
own account, White House Counsel Bob Bauer then advised
President Obama that this was a reasonable legal interpretation
of the WPR and the President himself, a former professor of
constitutional law, "decided to go forward with the operation on
that basis."69
67. Koh Libya Testimony, supra note 28, at 9 (emphasis added).
68. See SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 37, at 645.
69. Id. As former White House Counsel Bauer later wrote to me:
Charlie [Savage] reports someone's belief that I advised the President that the
view you and I shared about the interpretation of hostilities was
"available." . . . That belief is mistaken: I never have used that standard-
"availability"-for judging a legal theory. This is a topic-the boundaries of
acceptable legal advice under national security pressures-that I have spent
time thinking about.. . . In arriving at a conclusion much like the one you put
forward effectively to the Senate, I believed it to be a reasonable, good faith
interpretation, and I recognized that there would be disagreement with it, some
of it strong. But I did not use the word "available" and am generally opposed to
its use.
E-mail from Bob Bauer to Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of Int'l Law, Yale Law
Sch. (Mar. 4, 2016, 8:07 AM EST) (on file with Houston Law Review). Compare CHARLIE
SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 644-45 (2015) (ebook)
(reporting that Bauer had told the President that this theory was legally "available," but
clarifying that "[h]e may have said 'credible' or 'defensible"'), with Bob Bauer, Power Wars
Symposium: The Powers Wars Debate and the Question of the Role of the Lawyer in Crisis,
JUST SECURITY (Nov. 18, 2015, 9:15 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27712/powers-wars
-debate-question-role-lawyer-crisis/ (Bauer blogpost clarifying his belief that the legally
"'available' . . . standard . . . is fatally ambiguous and [one] that someone erroneously
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In presenting that position to the Senate shortly thereafter, I
took pains to stress the limits of our legal position:
Throughout the Libya episode, the President has never
claimed the authority to take the Nation to war without
congressional authorization, to violate the War Powers
Resolution or any other statute, to violate international law,
to use force abroad when doing so would not serve important
national interests, or to refuse to consult with Congress on
important war powers issues. The Administration recognizes
that Congress has powers to regulate and terminate uses of
force, and that the War Powers Resolution plays an
important role in promoting interbranch dialogue and
deliberation on these critical matters. The President has
expressed his strong desire for congressional support, and we
have been working actively with Congress to ensure
enactment of appropriate legislation. 70
A few days later, at a June 29th press conference, President
Obama publicly reiterated this legal view as representing both his
and the U.S. government's position.71 Curiously, Professor
Johnsen suggests that future presidents should not rely on the
legal position expressly adopted by President Obama-himself a
constitutional lawyer-in part because the process the
Administration followed was "highly unusual." But as she
correctly notes, "In any particular instance, the President clearly
possesses the authority to make the final call about which legal
analysis seems correct and will inform action. . . ."72
In response, Congress was free to reject the Executive Branch
interpretation and assert its warmaking prerogatives at any time
if it could organize itself to do so. Significantly, it did neither; to
suggested to Charlie Savage that I had embraced"). Throughout her response, Professor
Johnsen challenges the use of a lower standard of legality, even though she candidly
acknowledges that "President Obama did not act on this view in the Libya situation."
Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1077.
70. Koh Libya Testimony, supra note 28, at 12.
71. President Barack Obama, June 29 Press Conference, supra note 62, at 719 ("[D]o
I think that our actions in any way violate the War Powers Resolution? The answer is no.
So I don't even have to get to the constitutional question. There may be a time in which
there was a serious question as to whether or not the War Powers Resolution act was
constitutional. So I don't have to get to the question.").
72. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1075 (calling the process "highly unusual" because
"typically OLC would be the ultimate source of advice on the legality of a major,
questionable use of force such as this (informed though by other lawyers including those at
the Departments of Defense and State)"). But as Charlie Savage makes clear, Attorney
General Holder-to whom OLC reports-never rejected the President's position or called it
"clearly illegal." Instead, he said that he did not consider this "the best interpretation of the
statute in the eyes of the [D]epartment [of Justice], but that was not the same thing as
pronouncing the theory unavailable and out-of-bounds." SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note
37, at 646.
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the contrary, the key congressional leaders-including Speaker
John Boehner, former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, and
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair John Kerry-all took
pains to agree that continuation of U.S. military action in Libya did
not violate the War Powers Resolution. 73 Thereafter, three different
House resolutions were introduced challenging the interpretations,
but all three failed to pass. 7 4 Thus, as Savage concluded, "The
precedent Obama had carved out of the War Powers Resolution
stood uncontested by Congress as an institution . ... "7
Some academic commentators harshly criticized this
approach, making much of the reported disagreement among
73. See SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 37, at 643 ("[Alfter the sixty-day deadline
passed, all four of them-Boehner, Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, and Mitch McConnell-each
made public comments that suggested that they did not think the administration was
violating the War Powers Resolution.").
74. H.R. Res. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. Res. 6290, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. Con.
Res. 31, 112th Cong. (2011). In addition, Congress continued to fund the Libyan operation.
See Kathleen Hennessey, House Rebukes Obama on Libya, but Won't Cut Funds, L.A. TIMES
(June 24, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/24/nation/la-na-congress-libya
-20110625.
75. See SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 37, at 649. Professor Johnsen treats OLC's
nonconcurrence as a reason why "future administrations should not rely on" the Obama
legal position as providing a rationale for treating the Libya decision as precedent-even
though that position was adopted by the President himself, after careful consideration,
based on recommendation by the White House Counsel, after full interagency discussion
(including acceptance by the Attorney General). See supra note 72; Johnsen, supra note 17,
at 1074. Like Professor Johnsen, I am a proud alumnus of OLC and have written about its
critical role in Executive Branch lawmaking. See Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1104-05. But
while I have great respect for OLC, I fear that its academic alumni sometimes overstate its
governmental role, implying that that Office always has had-and always must have-
some kind of monopoly with respect to interpretation of national security or foreign affairs
law. To my mind, this is neither a desirable, nor an accurate description of, government
legal practice. Nor is it "clear," as Professor Johnsen suggests, "that a shift in
responsibilities away from OLC to other lawyers in the Executive Branch would not
appropriately serve the President or promote the rule of law." Id. at 1108. During my four
years as Legal Adviser, I attended many meetings on national security legal matters where
the Justice Department was represented not by the Office of Legal Counsel, but by other
DOJ branches, such as the National Security or Criminal Divisions. And even when it does
formally opine, OLC is not always right. Throughout her response here and her other
admirable scholarship, Professor Johnsen has pointed to many egregious legal errors made
by OLC during the George W. Bush era, which might have been avoided with a more robust
interagency legal process. As I have chronicled elsewhere, the State Department has long
been an authoritative interpreter of the meaning of treaties and international law. Koh,
supra note 23. In particular, as my Senate testimony on Libya pointed out, the State
Department Legal Adviser's Office has also long construed and presented the government's
public interpretations regarding the War Powers Resolution. See Kok Libya Testimony,
supra note 28, at 1, n. 1 (citing, inter alia, the 1975 Leigh-Hoffman Letter on the War Powers
Resolution, one of several important Executive Branch war powers opinions that did not
emanate from OLC). And as Professor Johnsen notes, "on some questions, there is not one
correct interpretation, and on occasion, multiple interpretations will be equally legitimate."
Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1106.
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Obama Administration lawyers. 76 But other distinguished
constitutional commentators, such as Richard Pildes" and Akhil
Amar,18 supported the Administration's view. Professor Laurence
Tribe of Harvard, perhaps our most distinguished living
constitutional scholar, originally questioned the position,79 but
later wrote me in October 2011 to say, "It's true that I was among
the people who were unpersuaded by your and the W[hite]
H[ouse]'s legal view of what constitute 'hostilities,' and I know
hindsight can be 20/20, but in retrospect I have to say that your
view of the matter may have been the wiser one."8 0
In her thoughtful article, Professor Johnsen joins those who
disagree with the Obama Administration's construction of the War
Powers Resolution's term "hostilities." But her response mainly
details her objection that the President did not follow OLC's
advice. Significantly, she never explains what the statutory
standard for "hostilities" should be or why the relatively small
amount of force being used by U.S. forces sixty days after initiation
(described in the graph above) exceeded the "hostilities" level.81
Indeed, Professor Johnsen nowhere addresses the main point of
my Libya testimony: that even if the U.S. military action may have
76. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Opinion, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES
(June 20, 2011), http://nyti.ms/19r2W28. Although Professor Johnsen suggests that her
view was shared at the time by a "consensus" of "most commentators," Johnsen, supra note
17, at 1099-1100, no commentary that I have seen-including hers-has adequately
grappled with either the factual account of the use of force in Libya or the legal analysis of
the statutory term "hostilities" that I have offered here. See infra text accompanying notes
81-82.
77. Richard Pildes, Power Wars Symposium: What Role Should Law Play in Areas of
Vital National and International Affairs?, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2015, 10:37 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/27583/role-should-law-play-areas-vital-national-internat
ional-affairs/.
78. Akhil Reed Amar, Bomb Away, Mr. President, SLATE (June 29, 2011, 5:11 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2011/06lbomb-away-mr.-pr
esident.single.html.
79. Paul Starobin, Opinion, A Moral Flip-Flop? Defining a War, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6,
2011), http://nyti.ms/1HFFmt4 (quoting Professor Tribe as initially saying, "I disagree
completely with [Harold Koh's] analysis of the War Powers Resolution").
80. E-mail from Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, Harv. Law Sch., to
Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of Int'l Law, Yale Law Sch. (Oct. 20, 2011, 10:33 PM
EST) (on file with Houston Law Review).
81. Professor Johnsen acknowledges that my "Senate testimony made a strong and
appropriately narrow case" for why "hostilities" were not occurring in Libya on the sixtieth
day. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1074. She further concedes that the WPR's text is
ambiguous, inasmuch as "[tihe statute does not define" "hostilities," a term she clarifies
only to the extent of calling it "more expansive than 'war' in the constitutional sense." Id.
at 1097-98. But while she embraces the three-part Dellinger test ("nature, scope, and
duration") for determining what constitutes "war" in a constitutional sense, supra note 17,
unlike my testimony, her response offers no similar multi-factor test to clarify what level
or nature of military activity would constitute "hostilities" in a statutory sense. Johnsen,
supra note 17.
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exceeded the "hostilities" level at its outset, it had fallen below that
level by the sixtieth day and was virtually guaranteed to stay at
that lower level because of the limited nature of the mission,
violence, exposure, and risk of escalation. Nor does she adequately
explain why Congress had not acquiesced in this construction of
the word "hostilities," when as Charlie Savage notes, "after the
sixty day deadline passed, all four of them"-the Speaker, former
Speaker, Senate Majority and Minority Leaders-"each made
public comments that suggested that they did not think the
administration was violating the War Powers Resolution." 82
Finally, Professor Johnsen has not clarified why, at least as a
matter of domestic law, President Obama's publicly stated legal
position on Libya did not set a relevant precedent for how the WPR
term "hostilities" will be construed in future cases. As I elaborate
further below, future multilateral operations that hew closely to
the Libya precedent-with a carefully limited humanitarian
mission, limited and low levels of violence, limited casualties and
a limited risk of escalation-would not rise to the level of statutory
"hostilities" and therefore would not violate the War Powers
Resolution if continued for more than sixty days.
Notwithstanding some claims that the Obama
Administration's war powers interpretation in Libya undermined
constitutional checks and balances, I continue firmly to believe
that it yielded both a better policy and a supportable, sustainable
legal precedent. There may have been subsequent tragedies in
Libya, but not because of this particular interpretation.8 3 In the
end, the Libyan war powers episode was not about violation of the
War Powers Resolution. It was about saving tens of thousands of
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Significantly, Professor Johnsen
challenges my claim that Congress has acquiesced in the Dellinger approach to initiation
of use of force, Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1095--96, but says nothing about whether
Congress acquiesced in the continuation of use of force in Libya past sixty days on the
ground that no violation of the WPR was occurring. With respect to that issue, I rely not
just on "mere recitations of operationally similar past uses of force," id. at 1095 (internal
quotation and citation omitted), but on public statements by the key congressional leaders
indicating that because congressional approval was unnecessary, continuation past sixty
days would not violate the WPR. See supra notes 37, 73-75. If, as she says, "one Congress
may not bind a subsequent Congress," Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1098, it is unclear how
the 1973 Congress bound the 2011 Libya Congress not to acquiesce in continuation of the
use of force in Libya.
83. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, A New Libya, with 'Very Little Time Left, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1TGZoLI; Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Hillary Clinton,
'Smart Power' and a Dictator's Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1RlCSWR;
Shadi Hamid, Everyone Says the Libya Intervention Was a Failure. They're Wrong., Vox
(Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/4/5/11363288/libya-intervention-success; see also
Kim Ghattas, Hillary Clinton Has No Regrets About Libya, FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 14, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/14/hillary-clinton-has-no-regrets-about-libya/ ("A European
diplomat told me recently the choice was between rivers of blood or a mess.").
2016] 997
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
lives through a restrained interpretation of that law, based on its
conceptual focus and the actual facts on the ground.
C. Syria
This brings me to the third and final case study, Syria, which
at this writing continues to present a horrible humanitarian
crisis.84 When the civil war first began in Syria, the initial policy
challenge for the West was how to combine the diplomatic strategy
to achieve a ceasefire, oust Assad, secure chemical weapons,
introduce humanitarian aid, and promote accountability. But the
soft power tools available were simply not sufficient to achieve
those broad objectives.
After Libya, the Russians made it clear that they intended to
veto similar Security Council resolutions, making impossible a
Security Council-authorized intervention in Syria. Russia refused
to vote for essentially the same U.N. Security Council language it
had supported in Libya, claiming that force had been overused on
that occasion to remove Qadhafi from power. Russia's obstinance
placed President Obama's diplomats for many months in the
awkward position of offering anodyne draft Security Council
resolutions in search of a linguistic formula that the Russians
would "abstain to" in the name of stopping the violence in Syria.
The implicit (and reasonable) U.S. diplomatic strategy was to get
the Russians on board to something, and then to escalate to
stronger Security Council resolutions if the one the Russians
finally let pass did not succeed in stopping the violence. But that
key first step never happened, notwithstanding Secretaries
Clinton and Kerry's repeated meetings with Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov and then-U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi in
search of a Security Council resolution the Russians would permit.
That brought us to August 20, 2013, when the Obama
Administration received unmistakable proof that the Syrian
leader Assad had launched a deliberate chemical assault on
innocent civilians after President Obama had warned that such an
act would cross a "red line." 85 The Arab League endorsed
84. For a discussion of the Syria case study, see SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note
37, at 627-54. For a discussion of the humanitarian crisis, see Michael Ignatieff & Leon
Wieseltier, Enough is Enough-U.S. Abdication on Syria Must Come to an End, WASH.
POST. (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-era-of-us-abdication
-on-syria-must-end/2016/02/09/55226716-ce96-11e5-88cd-753e80cd29ad -story.html; and
Michael Ignatieff, The Refugees and the New War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/refugees-and-new-war/. See also infra Part
III.C.3.
85. The President's News Conference, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 6 (Aug. 20,
2012), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200656/pdflDCPD-201200656.pdf.
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international action, but shied away from approving "all necessary
measures," making it difficult to invoke the U.N. Charter Article
52 "regional organizations" route to skirting a Russian veto that
had been famously deployed during the Cuban Missile Crisis.86
The British Attorney General issued a post-Kosovo legal opinion
indicating that humanitarian intervention without Security
Council resolution could be lawful under international law, but the
Prime Minister failed to secure parliamentary support for
intervention.87
Faced with weak support abroad and at home, President
Obama pushed the pause button not once, but twice. On August
30, 2013, he first said that instead of using the previously
threatened military force, he would seek prior approval from a
distracted and divided Congress, when he plainly had not secured
the necessary House votes.88 Two weeks later, he postponed
indefinitely that congressional vote-which he likely would have
lost-in order to pursue diplomatic alternatives that remain
ongoing.89
To my knowledge, the only public legal position the U.S.
government offered on the legality of intervention in Syria was a
quote by the White House Counsel to the New York Times. The
Counsel explained that, while an attack on Syria "may not fit
under a traditionally recognized legal basis under international
law," given the novel factors and circumstances, such an action
would nevertheless be "justified and legitimate under
86. Major Powers Hold UN Talks on Syria, AL JAZEERA AM. (Aug. 28, 2013, 5:52 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/28/uk-to-ask-securitycounciltoauthorizenecess
arymeasuresinsyria.htm1.
87. Joshua Rosenberg, Syria Intervention: It May Not Be Wise, but Using Force May
Be Lawful, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/lawl2013
/aug/28/syria-intervention-force-lawful. For the U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office's
formal legal position to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on the
international lawfulness of humanitarian intervention, see Letter from the Right Hon.
Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, to House of
Commons, Foreign Affairs Comm. on Humanitarian Intervention & the Responsibility to
Protect (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Letter
-from-UK-Foreign-Commonwealth-Office-to-the-House-of-Commons-Foreign-Affairs-Com
mittee-on-Humanitarian-Intervention-and-the-Responsibility-to-Protect.pdf (following the
Syria crisis in August 2013). The Danish government similarly concluded that use of force
would be justifiable under international law under exceptional circumstances for
humanitarian purposes. See Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Den. to
the Members of the Foreign Policy Comm. (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.ft.dk
/samling/2012 1/almdellurulbilag/225/1276239/index.htm.
88. Ernesto Londofio, Obama Says U.S. Will Take Military Action Against Syria,
Pending Congress's Approval, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2013), http://wpo.st/t6cT1.
89. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Syria (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks
-president-address-nation-syria.
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international law" and so not prohibited.90 As a matter of domestic
law, the Administration also apparently concluded that
congressional approval was not required. As the New York Times
reported, "[A] dministration lawyers decided that it was within Mr.
Obama's constitutional authority to carry out a strike on Syria as
well, even without permission from Congress or the Security
Council, because of the 'important national interests' of limiting
regional instability and of enforcing the norm against using
chemical weapons. . . ."91 The White House Counsel stated that
[t]he President believed that it was important to enhance the
legitimacy of any action that would be taken by the
executive . .. to seek Congressional approval of that action
and have it be seen, again as a matter of legitimacy both
domestically and internationally, that there was a unified
American response to the horrendous violation of the
international norm against chemical weapons use. 9 2
As in Libya, two questions arose under domestic law. At the
initiation stage, the constitutional question was: "Is this 'war?' At
the continuation stage (sixty or ninety days later), the statutory
question under the War Powers Resolution would have been: "Is
this 'hostilities?' On the first question, the White House Counsel
was plainly invoking Walter Dellinger's OLC opinion described
above, which Acting Attorney General for OLC Caroline Krass
had followed in Libya in 2011. That OLC opinion argued that the
President could constitutionally initiate military action without
prior congressional approval if: (a) the use of force served
significant national interests that have historically supported
unilateral actions-here, promoting regional stability and
preventing destruction of the near-century-old ban on chemical
weapons-and (b) if the operations were not expected-as the
President made clear in his September 10th Syria speech 93-to
be "sufficiently extensive in 'nature, scope, and duration' to
constitute a 'war' requiring prior specific congressional approval
under the Declaration of War Clause." 94 Under this reasoning, a
large-scale offensive of the type initiated in Iraq in 2003 would
plainly be "war," which requires congressional approval. But
even though Secretary Kerry mischaracterized the contemplated
Syrian assault as "unbelievably small," he was right to say that
90. Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1aX80Jq.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria, supra note 89.
94. Libya OLC Opinion, supra note 34.
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what was being envisioned was not "war" in a constitutional
sense.95
The statutory, "continuation" question-are these "hostilities"
that should be abated or brought up for congressional approval
sixty or ninety days after military action begins-would
presumably have been evaluated only if a military action were
continuing sixty days after it began. Whether the Obama
Administration would have determined at the sixty-day mark that
the Syria action constituted "hostilities" for the War Powers
Resolution would have depended on evaluation of the statutory
test stated in my 2011 Libya testimony: "[T]he unusual confluence
of ... four factors, in an operation that was expressly designed to
be limited-limited in mission, exposure of U.S. troops, risk of
escalation, and military means employed." In Libya, those factors
"led the President to conclude that the Libya operation did not fall
within the War Powers Resolution's automatic sixty-day pullout
rule."9 6 But depending on how the Syria mission would have been
defined, the number and nature of U.S. troops deployed, the risk
of escalation (which could well be much higher than in Libya), and
the degree of violence used, the same factors might easily have
come out differently in Syria.
Thus, under U.S. law, prior congressional approval was
probably not legally required for the limited strike that the
President proposed. Still, he reasonably deemed it politically
prudent, given the intense congressional questioning voiced
following the British parliamentary action. Still, President Obama
erred, not by announcing a "red line" against the use of chemical
weapons, but by failing to lay the political groundwork necessary
to successfully enforce it. He failed to make clear earlier that
Assad's deliberate launch of chemical weapons against his own
population would cross a near-century-old red line that had been
drawn not by Obama alone, but by international law.97 And he
failed-starting in August 2012 and earlier-to socialize first
congressional leaders and then key allies to publicly commit to
help enforce that red line if breached.
Had the President seriously intended to use force to discourage
a repeat use of chemical weapons, he should have engaged in better
sequencing: he should have secured multilateral approval for the
95. Jonathan Karl, John Kerry Promises "Unbelievably Small" U.S. Strike Against
Syria, ABC NEws (Sept. 9, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/john-kerry
-promises-unbelievably-small.u-s-strike-against-syrial.
96. Koh Libya Testimony, supra note 28, at 16.
97. Geneva Protocol, FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://fas.org/nuke/controllgeneval
intro.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
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use of force ex ante and then sought congressional authorization for
the use of military force (AUMF) up to the level of international
approval. This was the sequence secured by George H.W. Bush for
his military action against Saddam Hussein in 1991 and initially
attempted by Obama for his own prior military action in Libya.
Instead, President Obama drew a red line without doing the
domestic or international politics needed to defend it. That made
his abrupt threat of force in late summer of 2013 seem less
principled than unilateral, and strikingly inconsistent with his
broader-generally successful-first-term "smart power" approach
to foreign policy. Most disturbing, it led to the sad spectacle of
Vladimir Putin, at the same time as he was engaging in gross
violations of sovereignty in Ukraine, ostentatiously taking America
to task for violating international law.98
Still, Obama's threat had a catalyzing effect. It extracted
Assad's confession that he had a chemical weapons stockpile and
drew the Russians into a long-overdue diplomatic process. In his
September 2013 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Obama
wisely hit "reset," pushed back against Putin's dismissal of
American exceptionalism, and started to do what he should have
done diplomatically months earlier. He "re-nested" his Syria policy
amid two broader regional objectives: "Iran's pursuit of nuclear
weapons, and the Arab-Israeli conflict." And he re-sequenced, by
calling on U.N. members to support a Security Council resolution
on Syria and provide humanitarian assistance, recalling
international law to the historic task of meaningfully enforcing a
ban against "the brazen use of chemical weapons." 99
In effect, by putting the possibility of force back on the table,
President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry were able to
reenergize a stalemated diplomatic process that led to the
internationally supervised removal of chemical weapons from
Syria supervised by the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW).100
98. Vladimir V. Putin, Opinion, A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
11, 2013), http://nyti.ms/17V0yPh.
99. Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 2013 DAILY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 2, 4 (Sept. 24, 2013), https/www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201300655/html/DCPD
-201300655.htm. In the end, the U.N. Security Council, including Russia, finally agreed upon a
Syria resolution that includes the critical phrase: "Decides, in the event of non-compliance with this
resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons
by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter . . . ." S.C. Res. 2118, ¶ 21 (Sept. 27, 2013).
100. Naftali Bendavid, Removal of Chemical Weapons from Syria Is Completed, WALL




Unfortunately, apart from the newspaper quotes cited above,
the Obama Administration never laid out an explanation for why
use of force in Syria would have been consistent with
international law. Particularly after the conspicuous U.S. silence
regarding its legal rationale in Kosovo, a legal opinion of such
significance should have been laid out somewhere other than in
a newspaper quote. Given the importance of the issue, the Obama
Administration failed by not issuing a detailed legal opinion as
our British, Danish, and Belgian allies have all done. 101
Threatening military action in Syria without stating a public
legal rationale creates a dangerous precedent. As Abram Chayes
argued after the Cuban Missile Crisis, "Failure to justify in terms
of international law warrants and legitimizes disapproval and
negative responses from the other governments participating
directly in the process." 102  In the future, other
less-humanitarian-minded states can cite President Obama's
2013 threat to put their own broad spin on the legal
interpretation, using the murky concepts of humanitarian
intervention and R2P for their own self-interested purposes. In
both the Kosovo and Syria cases, the President's lawyers should
have explained-not just in lay terms, as President Obama
himself did, but in legal language that international lawyers can
debate (as the United Kingdom's Attorney General did in Syria
and in Kosovo)-how humanitarian intervention even without a
Security Council resolution could be lawful under international
law.103
Taken together, these three case studies yield a mixed legal
scorecard. In Kosovo, the Executive Branch argued that it had
initiated force in a manner that under international law some called
"illegal but legitimate." The military action continued after sixty
days, but according to the 2000 OLC opinion, was authorized by the
enactment of an eleventh-hour appropriation. In Libya, U.N.
Security Council resolutions took care of the lawfulness of initiation
under international law, and the 2011 Krass OLC opinion supported
the claim that the United States was not at "war" for constitutional
purposes. The four-factor "no-hostilities" test then supported the
claim that the military action had lawfully continued after sixty days.
Finally, in Syria, force has been used for humanitarian purposes, but
101. See supra notes 13 and 87 and accompanying text.
102. CHAYES, supra note 40, at 44.
103. Andr6 Nollkaemper, Intervention in Syria and International Law: Inside or Out?,




only on a very limited basis.104 At this writing, the United States has
yet to articulate either a full domestic or international law rationale
that would justify the use of humanitarian force in the absence of an
authorizing U.N. Security Council resolution, which does not seem to
be forthcoming any time soon.
III. DEVELOPING LEGAL STANDARDS
A. An International Legal Test for R2P
If international law is to recognize a responsibility to protect,
what should the legal standard be? Obviously, we cannot fully
evaluate the lawfulness of any state's use of force until we know
the precise factual circumstances under which it chooses to take
action. But let's start by distinguishing the legal question-is the
option of military force available under domestic or international
law?-from the policy question-would it be wise to use military
force in Syria for limited humanitarian purposes? No one denies
that the policy question presents a vexing judgment call, even if
the intended use of force were very limited. But the prior and
distinct legal question is whether the policy option to use military
force would ever be available under international law. I believe
that international law has evolved sufficiently to permit morally
legitimate action to prevent atrocities by responding, for example,
to the deliberate use of chemical weapons.
Among international legal commentators, the party line
seemed to be that President Obama was threatening blatantly
illegal military action in Syria, for the simple reason that the
Russians were not on board. 0 5 The conventional argument, put
forth by, among others, my Yale friends and colleagues Oona
Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, is "per se illegality": In their view,
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter permits individual and collective
self-defense but bars any and all other forms of intervention
without express Security Council authorization.106 They see the
Syrian crisis as a moment to reaffirm that acting without a U.N.
Security Council resolution is per se illegal. But is international
law really so black and white?
104. See Peter Baker, Obama, with Reluctance, Returns to Action in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1mrnaIr; Helene Cooper & Michael D. Shear, Militants' Siege
on Mountain in Iraq Is Over, Pentagon Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/1sWQj47 (reporting U.S. air strikes carried out to rescue Yazidi refugees).
105. Debate Map: Use of Force Against Syria, OXFORD PUB. INT'L L.,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/debate-map-syrialdebate-map-use-of-force-against-syria (last
updated Apr. 29, 2014).
106. Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Opinion, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn't
Optional, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1DMbgki.
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I agree instead with former British Legal Adviser Sir Daniel
Bethlehem that "[i]n the case of the law on humanitarian
intervention, an analysis that simply relies on the prohibition of
the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, and
its related principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, is overly
simplistic."1 0 7 It treats a crucial fact that marks the Syrian
situation-Russia's persistent, cynical veto-as an absolute bar to
lawful action, not as a sign of a systemic dysfunction that bars the
United Nations from achieving its stated goals in Syria: protection
of human rights, preservation of peace and security, and a
proscription against the deliberate use of banned weapons. A "per
se illegal" rule would overlook many other pressing facts of great
concern to international law that distinguish Syria from past
cases: including the catastrophic humanitarian situation, the
likelihood of future atrocities, the grievous nature of
already-committed atrocities that amount to crimes against
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the
growing likelihood of regional insecurity, and the documented
deliberate and indiscriminate use of chemical weapons against
civilians in a way that threatens a century-old ban.
On reflection, a "per se illegal" rule is plainly overbroad. If
U.N. "procedural standards require the consensus of the five
permanent members of the Security Council and at least four of
the elected members[, t]his produces a significant danger of
underintervention."108 If no self-defense considerations arose, such
a rule would permanently disable any external collective action,
for example, to protect the population of any U.N. permanent
member state from genocide. By treating the veto alone as
dispositive, the per se position denies any nation, no matter how
well-meaning, any lawful way to use even limited and multilateral
force to prevent Assad from intentionally gassing a million Syrian
children tomorrow! In the name of fidelity to the United Nations
and this rigid conception of international law, leaders would either
have to accept civilian slaughter or break the law because
international law offers no lawful alternative to prevent the
slaughter. The question not asked is whether preventing that
slaughter would further the purposes of international law and the
U.N. system far more than a rigid reading of Article 2(4) that
107. Sir Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment-The Legal Basis in Favour of a
Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of
-humanitarian-intervention/.
108. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: JOHN STUART MILL AND
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 204 (2015).
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privileges over all others one systemic value-territorial
sovereignty.
In his September 2013 speech to the U.N. General Assembly,
using lay language, President Obama pointedly challenged the
conventional, absolutist view:
Different nations will not agree on the need for action in
every instance, and the principle of sovereignty is at the
center of our international order. But sovereignty cannot be
a shield for tyrants to commit wanton murder, or an excuse
for the international community to turn a blind eye. While
we need to be modest in our belief that we can remedy every
evil, while we need to be mindful that the world is full of
unintended consequences, should we really accept the notion
that the world is powerless in the face of a Rwanda or
Srebrenica? If that's the world that people want to live in,
they should say so and reckon with the cold logic of mass
graves... . I believe we can embrace a different future. 109
What, as a matter of international law, would that future look
like? Like Bethlehem, I believe that under certain highly
constrained circumstances, a nation could lawfully use or threaten
force for genuinely humanitarian purposes, even absent
authorization by a U.N. Security Council resolution. This was the
path the United States and its NATO allies followed in Kosovo in
1999 and President Obama proposed in Syria in 2013 before the
U.S.-Russian diplomatic initiative took center stage.
Under this view, had President Obama proceeded in Syria as
he had threatened, the United States would not have been in
flagrant breach of international law, but rather, in a legal gray
zone. Like its allies, the United States should have treated Syria
as a lawmaking moment to crystallize a limited concept of
humanitarian intervention, capable of breaking a veto
stranglehold in extreme circumstances, to prevent the deliberate
use of forbidden weapons to kill civilians.
Chapter I of the U.N. Charter states the broad "Purposes and
Principles" that guide the United Nations: including, 'To maintain
international peace and security, . . . promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights," and (to quote the Charter's preamble) "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," including,
presumably, stopping mass slaughter by use of chemical weapons. 110
Read in context, the Charter's bar on national uses of force should
be understood not as the end in itself, but as a means for promoting
109. Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, supra note
99 (emphasis added).
110. U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1, ¶¶ 1, 3.
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the United Nations' broader purposes. Article 2(4) states that "[aill
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."'1 ' The Article's final clause-
"in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations"-leaves open whether Article 2(4) would permit a threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity of a state in a case where
that threat or action proved essential to effectuate the United
Nations' purposes. Some have already argued that because threats
of use of force can serve the United Nations' overriding purposes,
they are not currently and should not be seen as per se illegal.112
Nor, as Article 51 makes clear, is Article 2(4)'s ban categorical: the
Charter expressly accepts one customary international law
exception permitting use of force against another state for purposes
of individual and collective self-defense. The issue is whether the
Charter accepts another exception that permits the threat or use of
force against another state when a persistent Security Council
deadlock obstructs the United Nations' capacity to achieve its stated
humanitarian, anti-war purposes.
In essence, the "per se illegal" position amounts to saying that
international law has not progressed in nearly two decades since
Kosovo. But why, as a matter of ethics, political legitimacy, law or
history, should we accept that as a given? Since Kosovo, as political
scientist Martha Finnemore has documented, within the
international legal order, the multilateral use of force for
humanitarian ends is perceived as far more legitimate than it was
only a few decades ago. 113 Drawing on the writings of John Stuart
Mill, political theorist Michael Doyle has recently reviewed at
length the evolution in the study of ethics of the Responsibility to
Protect as a "newly legitimate moral minimum of global order."" 4
International law scholar Anne Orford, in a recent detailed
historical review of the legal evolution of Responsibility to Protect,
explores the widespread and growing global effort to implement
the R2P concept.' 1 5 These commentators all stress the need to
111. Id., art. 2, f 4.
112. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Global Legal Norms, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 11, 2013, 11:59 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/1913/humanitarian
-intervention-global-legal-norms/ ("The threat to use force for humanitarian intervention
essentially gets a legal pass.").
113. See generally MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION: CHANGING
BELIEFS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE (2003).
114. DOYLE, supra note 108, at 110.




develop the law and norms of humanitarian intervention to better
balance the dangers of overintervention (think Putin in Georgia
and Ukraine) against the dangers of underintervention (e.g.,
Bosnia and Rwanda).
The customary international law concept of humanitarian
intervention dates back to Grotius and the seventeenth century." 6
Since the birth of the U.N. Charter, examples of state practice
often invoked to illustrate humanitarian intervention in action
include India's incursion into East Pakistan to help create
Bangladesh in 1971117 and Tanzania's intervention into Uganda to
help oust Idi Amin in 1978-1979.118 Kosovo catalyzed the
international legal movement to explore whether there is an
international Responsibility to Protect. Since Kosovo, the R2P
concept "has been invoked, explicitly and implicitly, successfully
and unsuccessfully, in cases ranging from Myanmar and Kenya in
2008, to Guinea in 2009, and. . . Libya in 2011."119
The R2P movement pointedly shifted the legal debate from the
statist claim that individual nations have an amorphous,
discretionary "right of humanitarian intervention" to the collective
notion that the international community has a duty or "responsibility
to protect" a nation's citizens when the national government has
undeniably forfeited that responsibility. As Orford explains:
[R2P] is premised on the notion that authority, to be
legitimate, must be effective at guaranteeing protection, and
that the failure to protect a population is a factual matter that
can be determined by the international community. The
responsibility to protect concept thus grounds authority-both
of states and of the international community--on the capacity
to provide effective protection to populations at risk.1 20
Under R2P reasoning, a national government's blatant failure to
protect its own citizens from gross abuses creates a vacuum of
protection that other entities may lawfully fill. But which entities?
116. See supra note 10; see also SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE
UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 43 (1996) ("Grotius maintained that resort
to war was lawful, under natural law and the law of nations, when doing so was based on
a just cause .... ). For a historical review of the origins of the concept of humanitarian
intervention prior to the U.N. Charter, see generally id. at 33-64.
117. See generally GARY J. BASS, THE BLOOD TELEGRAM: NIXON, KISSINGER, AND A
FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE (2013); Gary J. Bass, The Indian Way ofHumanitarian Intervention,
40 YALE J. INT'L L. 227 (2015). The fact that nations like India invoked a nonhumanitarian
rationale in the India-Pakistan episode suggests that states have not worked hard enough
to state a humanitarian legal principle that better fits those pressing factual circumstances.
118. See, e.g., Daniel G. Acheson-Brown, The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda: A Just
War?, 12 INT'L THIRD WORLD STUD. J. & REV. 1 (2001).
119. DOYLE, supra note 108, at 110.
120. ORFORD, supra note 115, at 16.
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In 2001, the government of Canada convened a distinguished
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
that supported and delineated the contours of an international
law, the Responsibility to Protect.121 Three years later, the
High-Level U.N. Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
"endorse[d] the emerging norm that there is a collective
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security
Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort." 122 At
the 2005 World Summit, member states declared that "we are
prepared to take collective action . . . through the Security
Council . . . on a case-by-case basis . . . should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity." 123 In this way, "[tihe
inclusion of the responsibility to protect concept in the World
Summit Outcome 'transformed the principle, from a commission
proposal actively supported by a relatively small number of
like-minded states' to a concept 'endorsed by the entire UN
membership."' 1 2 4 In 2006, the Security Council reaffirmed that
conclusion in its Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in
armed conflict. 12 5 And in 2011, the Security Council reiterated "the
responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan
population" by voting, with Russia abstaining, for all necessary
measures to ensure the protection of Libyan civilians. 126
Left unanswered in this legal evolution was what should
happen if both the national government and the Security Council
fail to fulfill their responsibility to protect? While the U.N. Charter
obviously gives the Security Council first responsibility to act
when a state uses chemical weapons to kill its own civilians,
Article 2(4) nowhere makes that an exclusive responsibility. So if
the Council repeatedly failed to fill that vacuum of protection by
discharging that responsibility, could a group of states with
genuinely humanitarian motives act collectively and lawfully for
the sole purpose of protecting civilians? Anticipating this question,
121. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
122. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, annex I, 1 55 (Dec. 2, 2004).
123. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome ¶ 139 (Oct. 24, 2005).
124. ORFORD, supra note 115, at 17 (quoting ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT To END MASS ATROCITIES 95 (2009)).
125. Press Release, Security Council, Importance Of Preventing Conflict Through
Development, Democracy Stressed, As Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution
1674, U.N. Press Release SC/8710 (Apr. 28, 2006).
126. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 32, pmbl., ¶ 4.
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the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty argued:
[I]f the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility
[to protect] in conscience-shocking situations crying out for
action, then it is unrealistic to expect that concerned states
will rule out other means and forms of action to meet the
gravity and urgency of these situations. 127
Viewed in this light, Syria arguably presented an even
stronger case for intervention than Kosovo. A U.N. report
concluded unequivocally that chemical weapons were used on a
relatively large scale near Damascus on August 21, 2013, causing
numerous civilian casualties; U.S. and allied intelligence
concluded that only the Assad regime could have carried out such
a large-scale chemical weapons attack.1 28 Suppose that in
response, a group of nations had sought to fill the vacuum of
protection to prevent future chemical releases without invoking
either a "legal right of humanitarian intervention" or even a legal
claim of R2P (in the sense of claiming an international legal duty
to intervene). Suppose further that these states claimed instead
an ex post exemption from legal wrongfulness. The International
Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility recognize, for
example, that extreme circumstances such as distress and
necessity would preclude claims of international wrongfulness
against an acting state and permit certain forms of
countermeasures to stop illegal acts by others. 129
Whether the collective action would ultimately be judged
internationally lawful would then depend critically on what
happened next, particularly if the Security Council condoned the
action after the fact. By comparison, in Kosovo NATO took action
and the Russians offered a U.N. Security Council resolution of
disapproval. Twelve of fifteen Security Council members voted to
reject it, including many non-NATO members, effectively agreeing
that the NATO intervention could continue. In Resolution 1244,
the Security Council later approved the Kosovo settlement,
effectively ratifying the NATO action under international law.130
So how to embody these considerations in an international
legal test? As Professor Deeks ably summarizes in her Symposium
127. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 121, at 55.
128. Erin Pelton, United Nations Releases Report on the Use of Chemical Weapons in
Syria, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Sept. 18, 2013, 2:50 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov
Iblog/2013/09/18/united-nations-releases-report-use-chemical-weapons-syria.
129. See G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, arts. 24-25 (Jan. 28, 2002).
130. S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999).
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article, several legal interpreters have attempted that task.13 1 I
would suggest the following test:
(1) If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences significantly
disruptive of international order-including proliferation of
chemical weapons, massive refugee outflows, and events
destabilizing to regional peace and security-that would likely
soon create an imminent threat to the acting nations (which would
give rise to an urgent need to act in individual and collective
self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51);
(2) a Security Council resolution were not available because
of persistent veto; and the group of nations that had persistently
sought Security Council action had exhausted all other remedies
reasonably available under the circumstances, they would not
violate U.N. Charter Article 2(4) if they used
(3) limited force for genuinely humanitarian purposes that
was necessary and proportionate to address the imminent threat,
would demonstrably improve the humanitarian situation, and
would terminate as soon as the threat is abated.
In particular, these nations' claim that their actions were not
wrongful would be strengthened if they could demonstrate:
(4) that the action was collective, e.g., involving the General
Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution 32 or regional
arrangements under U.N. Charter Chapter VIIIl33;
(5) that collective action would prevent the use of a per se
illegal means by the territorial state, e.g., deployment of banned
chemical weapons; or
(6) would help to avoid a per se illegal end, e.g., genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or an avertable humanitarian
disaster, such as the widespread slaughter of innocent civilians,
for example, another Halabja or Srebrenica.
To be credible, the legal analysis of any particular
situation would need to substantiate each of these factors with
persuasive factual evidence of: (1) Disruptive Consequences likely
to lead to Imminent Threat; (2) Exhaustion; (3) Limited,
Necessary, Proportionate, and Humanitarian Use of Force;
(4) Collective Action; (5) Illegal Means; and (6) Avoidance of
Illegal Ends.
131. See generally Deeks, supra note 22; infra Part III.E.
132. G.A. Res. 377 (V), Uniting for Peace (Nov. 3, 1950).
133. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 52, [ 1 ("Nothing in the present Charter precludes the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action,
provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.").
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Professor Deeks's thoughtful response in this Symposium
acknowledges that international law, multi-factor tests of the kind
I propose here are commonly used to structure and defend state
uses of force. She recognizes that such tests offer opportunities for
law specification and development, reduce the likelihood of
interstate conflict, and reduce transaction costs for states in
articulating a "balance between over- and under-permissiveness of
force." 1 34 She aptly analogizes such tests to "a grain of sand in an
oyster, providing a set of concrete ideas and standards around
which states may coalesce and ultimately create customary
international law." 1 3 5 In my parlance, they create an occasion for
"transnational legal process": "a focal point for state discussions
[that] organizes states' arguments, stimulates reactions . .. and
facilitates horizontal adoption by other states [while] serv[ing] as
the basis for developing new treaty rules." 1 36 She also credits legal
tests for humanitarian intervention with being "more rule-like
than ... other [multi-part tests for jus ad bellum] ... because they
include elements, each of which must be met before action would
be lawful, and those elements are both numerous and likely to
occur in combination in very few cases," imposing "particularly
high thresholds before allowing states to conclude that force would
be legal." 1 37 While Professor Deeks predicts that my proposed test
''may well achieve" "more coherent and thoughtful debates about
humanitarian intervention by ... letting it serve as a focal point
for discussion," she also predicts that my proposed test is "likely to
encounter continued skepticism, at least in the near term" because
"it is an effort to use a [legal test] to create a new exception to the
[U.N.] Charter's prohibition on the use of force rather than an
effort to interpret or translate existing exceptions."1 38
Even if Professor Deeks's prediction is right, I still think it is
worth the effort. My aim is to define the contours of a narrow lawful
exception to an overly rigid prohibition: an "affirmative defense" that
would render lawful otherwise illegal behavior. This approach has
the virtue of forthrightness, inasmuch as affirmative defenses, by
their nature, do not deny that a legal rule was disobeyed. Instead,
they assert after the fact that the usual legal penalty should not be
exacted, because in hindsight we cannot judge the behavior wrongful.
By analogy, in tort law, onlookers generally have no legal
responsibility to act as Good Samaritans, and the law does not
134. Deeks, supra note 22, at 1046.
135. Id. at 1045.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1063 (emphasis omitted).
138. Id. at 1039, 1064.
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either authorize or oblige them to do so ex ante. When they do
intervene and act prudently and with restraint, however, the law
generally excuses them from ex post wrongfulness. 139 In the same
way, my proposed test would impose a very high ex ante
justification that fits a narrow loophole (Professor Deeks's
"rule-like" Multi-Part Test), combined with a more forgiving ex
post exemption from wrongfulness for those interventions that
meet the high standards with actual exigent facts.
In my view, such an international legal rule would better
balance the risks of under- versus over-intervention than either an
absolutist reading of Article 2(4) or an amorphous claim of a
responsibility to protect that can be unilaterally invoked without
clear legal standards. After Kosovo, my late friend (and prior
Frankel commentator) Tom Francko40 came to a similar
conclusion, although he had long been a skeptic on humanitarian
intervention. Having argued that nations are more likely to
comply with international law rules that they perceive as fair and
legitimate, 141 Franck evidently concluded that a legal rule
forthrightly permitting humanitarian intervention in urgent
circumstances would have more "compliance pull" than an
absolutist rule exalting state sovereignty over human rights. He
summarized the state practice since Kosovo as reflecting
the evolution of a subsidiary adjectival international law of
mitigation, one that may formally continue to assert the
illegality of state recourse to force but which, in
ascertainable circumstances, mitigates the consequence of
such wrongful acts by imposing no, or only nominal,
consequences on states which . . . have demonstrably
prevented the occurrence of some greater wrong.1 42
Perhaps this personal story can clarify why this approach
makes common sense. On the day our first child was born, my wife
139. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.151(a) (West Supp. 2015) ("A
person who in good faith administers emergency care is not liable in civil damages for an
act performed during the emergency unless the act is wilfully or wantonly negligent . . . .");
McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 742-43 (Tex. 2003) (holding that a Texas physician
who voluntarily assisted in the delivery of an infant bore no liability for the infant's injuries
due to claimed negligence).
140. See Harold Hongju Koh, A Toast to "Tom the Frank,"35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
303 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh et al., The Invisible College of Thomas Franck, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1389 (2009).
141. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990). See also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2641-45 (1997) (analyzing Franck's scholarly focus).
142. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS 139 (2002) (emphasis added).
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went into intense labor. We drove urgently to the hospital, and by
the time we arrived, it had become very clear that our baby would
be coming very soon. As I pulled into the hospital parking space, I
saw that it read "One-Hour Parking Zone: Absolutely No
Exceptions." I ran upstairs. Fifty-five minutes later, as our child
was on her way, I glanced at my watch and wondered whether our
car would be towed. But as you can imagine, I did not go out to put
money in the meter. Several hours later, I ran downstairs, only to
find my car still sitting there, without any ticket. Did I break the
law? I certainly didn't offer to pay for the time I had stayed past
one hour. And if I had gotten a ticket, I probably would have fought
the ticket, saying that I had a defense of necessity. I was told later
that in fact, the hospital rarely, if ever, enforced the one-hour
limit. You see, the sign's ostensibly absolutist wording was
designed not to forbid, but to deter: to ensure that people who park
in that emergency space move their cars as quickly as possible
after a delivery, which we had in fact done. So we had obeyed the
spirit, if not the letter, of the legal plan. We had been given no
authorization ex ante; but neither had we suffered any penalty ex
post.
You see the parallel: if you do what you think is both right
and necessary under exigent circumstances, you incur a risk of an
ex post determination of wrongfulness. Your keen awareness of
that risk both deters imprudent intervention and limits its
duration. But the international community can approve after the
fact or otherwise make clear that it condones such an intervention,
if taken for the right reasons in the heat of the moment. In both
cases, the absolutist legal rule should be read to discourage, not to
forbid. It should be read as designed to deter imprudent action and
to speed emergency action, not to prevent action altogether when
the most urgent circumstances demand.
To describe this international legal standard is not to say that
Obama's threatened 2013 use of force in Syria fully met it. We
cannot fully evaluate the lawfulness of any nation-state's claimed
humanitarian use of force until we evaluate the precise factual
circumstances under which it actually makes that decision. But in
my view, developing such a legal standard is far preferable to
simply and repeatedly re-swearing fealty to an absolutist and
overbroad conception of sovereignty that tolerates gross atrocities.
In sum, the Clinton Administration's failure to articulate a
clear legal rationale for its Kosovo intervention haunts us now.
Continuing to threaten military action on humanitarian grounds
without ever stating a persuasive public legal rationale creates a
dangerous precedent. If modern international law cannot be read
to permit such a limited use of force to protect human rights,
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international lawyers must begin a debate to help reframe and
refurbish those international law rules. We have reached a
lawmaking moment, where international lawyers in and out of
government need to discuss and define a narrow "affirmative
defense" to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter that would clarify the
contours of an emerging lawful exception to a rigid rule. Reading
an implied narrow exception into that rigid rule would better
balance the risks of over- and under-action in the most dire
situations.
B. U.S. Domestic Law
If the United States were to adopt my proposed international
law test for R2P, could it be applied consistently with our domestic
law? Under the U.S. legal standards described above, 143 the initial
constitutional question would again be: Is this "war?" If it were a
true, carefully crafted multilateral effort to implement an
international Responsibility to Protect as a last resort, the answer
would probably be no. In most cases, the President could cite the
Dellinger and Krass OLC opinions discussed above to explain why
the compelling national interest implicated and the limited
nature, scope, and duration of the military action anticipated
would justify a decision to commit forces initially for humanitarian
purposes without prior congressional approval. 44
If that initial commitment were done multilaterally, in a
manner similar to the 2011 Libyan operation-with a limited
mission, limited and low levels of violence, limited casualties, and
a limited risk of escalation-the Libyan precedent would suggest
that the action would not rise to the level of statutory "hostilities"
and therefore would not violate the War Powers Resolution if
continued for more than sixty days. But if those conditions did not
obtain, "hostilities" would plainly exist, and the durational limit
would apply. One goal of stating the four Libyan "hostilities"
factors was to cabin and channel the precedential value of that
incident by providing a transparent, contestable argument in an
area where past presidents had been coy at best. The Libya test
laid down some parameters that would prevent future presidents
from ignoring the statute in future unlike cases.
As a political matter, if the President were to decide in good
faith that he must intervene militarily to prevent a genuine
humanitarian disaster, most members of Congress would probably
want to avoid being implicated, and so would give the President
143.
144.
See supra Part H.A.
See Dellinger Opinion, supra note 17; Libya OLC Opinion, supra note 34.
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the initial benefit of the doubt, particularly if he deployed no or
few American boots on the ground. So if the intervention were
right-sized and succeeded quickly, Congress would likely stay
silent; if it foundered, they could criticize the action later on.
I would guess that few humanitarian crises will rise to the level
of sustained "hostilities." This will be particularly true in situations
like Libya, where the U.S. role is limited and carefully delimited by
the international legal instruments that authorize the use of force
and does not involve sustained deployment of American boots on the
ground in the territory or airspace of a foreign country. If so, Libya
could become the paradigm case for humanitarian intervention,
because of the peculiar convergence of conditions, described above.
Although Congress plainly didn't want to act, by adopting a
statutory interpretation of "hostilities" that nevertheless seemed
consistent with the WPR's legislative plan, the United States
prevented thousands of people from being slaughtered. If Congress
disagreed, it was entirely free to reassert that durational limit after
the fact. But not only did it fail to do so, key congressional leaders
took pains to state that the WPR had not been violated. These facts
all suggest that the legislature effectively acknowledged and
acquiesced in such an interpretation, which creates a situation-
specific test for what should constitute "hostilities" for future
invocations of the WPR's durational limit.1 4 5
C. A Lawmaking Moment?
To this day, the United States has not articulated its legal
tests for R2P under either international or domestic law. In my
view, an international lawmaking moment was missed after
Kosovo, and a domestic and international lawmaking moment was
missed after Syria. In each case, the United States failed to
articulate a coherent international legal rationale for
Responsibility to Protect, instead relying on the muddy notion that
at certain unspecified moments, humanitarian intervention might
be "illegal but legitimate." Similarly, in each case, the difficult
constitutional and statutory war powers issues surrounding
humanitarian intervention remained unaddressed.
145. I of course agree with Professor Johnsen that the President must respect
constitutional congressional action to impose limits on his freedom of action. Where we may
disagree, however, is about whether Congress's recent restrictions on the President's
authority to close Guantanamo are entirely constitutional. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A
False Choice on Guantanamo Closure, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 2, 2015, 12:05 PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/27298/false-choice-guantanamo-closure/; Harold Hongju Koh,




1. International Law. In 2013, White House Counsel Kathy
Ruemmler told the New York Times "that while an attack on Syria
'may not fit under a traditionally recognized legal basis under
international law,' the administration believed that given the
novel factors and circumstances, such an action would
nevertheless be 'justified and legitimate under international law'
and so not prohibited." 14 6 But no further explanation was ever
released. Given the importance of the issue, the U.S. government
should have explained in legal language that international
lawyers could debate why a limited use of force in extraordinary
circumstances was consistent with international law.1 47
One need not accept my proposed legal standard to agree that
we urgently need the legal debate. If we do not announce and
clarify our standards, we can expect less-humanitarian-minded
states to interpret the notion of R2P to serve their own, less noble
purposes.
The "per se illegal" reading of Article 2(4) relies on
interpretive techniques of originalism and textualism that many
of us would challenge if, say, Robert Bork or Antonin Scalia were
applying them to constitutional law.14 8 As I have noted above, the
"territorial sovereignty rule" is not nearly so black and white as
the absolutists claim, because textual ambiguity in Article 2(4),
the broader structural purposes of the U.N. Charter, and some
recent significant state practice give far more legal play in the
joints than textual absolutists would concede. 49 Like other
originalist/textualist interpretations, the absolutist position does
not acknowledge that the United Nations has multiple purposes-
including protecting human rights, promoting regional security,
and ending the scourge of war-instead flattening those purposes
to the single goal of protecting sovereignty.
If Article 2(4) were as absolute as the textualists claim, Assad
would remain free to use chemical weapons against his own
civilian citizens with impunity. And if the absolutists are right,
President Obama still could not lawfully threaten force, even in
146. Savage, supra note 90.
147. See Nollkaemper, supra note 103.
148. For three examples, see Kevin Jon Heller, Four Thoughts on Koh's Defense of
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, OPINIO JURIS (Oct.* 2, 2013, 8:26 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/02/four-thoughts-kohs-defense-unilateral-humanitarian
-intervention/; David Kaye, Harold Koh's Case for Humanitarian Intervention, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 7, 2013, 1:45 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/l730/kaye-kohs-case/; and
Carsten Stahn, On 'Humanitarian Intervention' Lawmaking'Moments and What the Law
Ought to Be' -Counseling Caution Against a New 'Affirmative Defense to Art. 2(4)' After
Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 8, 2013, 4:03 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/08/guest-post
-humanitarian-intervention-lawmaking-moments-law-counseling-caution-new-affirmative-de/.
149. See Goodman, supra note 112.
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the face of Assad's renewed use of chemical weapons and further
Russian veto, because modern international law requires
accepting the repeated, indefinite, deliberate slaughter of
thousands of civilians with a per se illegal weapon of war.
"This is a conundrum," one such commentator concedes, "[b]ut
it remains the law."150 But why should the per se rule "remain the
law," particularly if it is so manifestly outmoded and tolerant of
gross human rights abuse? Whether or not Clinton's lawyers were
correct seventeen years ago not to follow the United Kingdom and
state a legal rationale justifying Kosovo, why should that silence
continue? Perhaps consolidation of a new "affirmative defense"
failed to gain sufficient global support in the process leading up to
the adoption of the R2P principle by the 2005 World Summit. But
when the Equal Rights Amendment failed to pass, did we just
throw in the towel and say "so much for consolidation of legal
support for women's rights?" Given the stakes, why, more than a
decade later, isn't it again time to revisit this pressing question?
Whether or not one agrees with the international legal rule
suggested above, it should be clear that there is a big difference
between calling intervention per se illegal and treating it as a very
tough legal and policy call. If President Obama cannot lawfully
threaten force in Syria even if Assad again uses chemical weapons
on civilians and the Russians again veto a Security Council
resolution, then modern international law requires accepting the
repeated, indefinite, deliberate slaughter of thousands of civilians
with a per se illegal weapon of war. The claim that use of force
outside the Security Council is "per se illegal" effectively concedes
that the international prohibition on the use of chemical weapons
cannot be enforced, because the only available enforcement
mechanism is Security Council action, which absent U.N. reform
will always be subject to Russian, Chinese, or other veto. I fully
agree that U.N. Security Council reform is long overdue and that
the United States should actively work to make it happen. But in
the meantime, accepting the "per se illegal" position would make
all Kosovos illegal, more Rwandas and Syrias likely, and the
erosion of the categorical ban on chemical weapons inevitable.
Some claim that we cannot craft a legal exception to the per
se rule because it is inherently too malleable, or because human
dignity can be adequately protected by calling urgent action
"illegal but legitimate." 15 1 This strikes me as a failure of lawyerly
responsibility, which we would never accept in other legal
150. Kaye, supra note 148.
151. See Michael Ignatieff, How to Save the Syrians, N.Y. REV. BooKs: NYR DAILY
(Sept. 13, 2013, 5:48 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/09/13/how-save-syrians/.
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situations. After all, do courts tell ambulance drivers who ran red
lights to prevent deaths that their actions are illegal because they
might encourage ambulance chasers to do the same thing? Did we
tell different-race couples that if they married, they should
consider those statuses permanently "illegal but legitimate?" In
each of those areas, lawyers did not accept an unfair law, but
rather updated the law to better suit human purposes.
If we similarly try to make new law here, some commentators
ask: Might we inadvertently craft a rule that others could abuse
later? Perhaps. But whether styled as "justification," "mitigation,"
or "exception," my proposed international law test invites lawyers
and policymakers to work together to clarify both the limited
contours of their discretion to use force in humanitarian crises,
while stating limiting principles to guide and constrain future
actors.
2. Domestic Law. In much the same way, we plainly need a
better system of checks and balances and constitutional
governance than the current, "take-no-prior-position,
wait-and-see, blame-if-it-fails" attitude that has come to
characterize Congress's approach to the war powers during the
second decade of the twenty-first century. Unlike some, I have
never been an enthusiast about the War Powers Resolution. A
quarter-century ago, I wrote about its most glaring defect:
[T]he resolution's greatest failing lies in a structural flaw. Its
sixty-day automatic withdrawal provision would require the
president to remove troops that he has already committed,
without Congress ever having made a specific judgment that
such a commitment was unwise.... Thus, the resolution does
not directly encourage meaningful interbranch dialogue
regarding the wisdom of any particular presidential
commitment of troops. It promotes that end only indirectly,
by threatening the president and Congress with a sixty-day
statutory time limit to force them to engage in such a
dialogue. Because ... the three branches have rendered the
sixty-day limit non-self-executing, that deadline has lost its
power to push the president toward consultation or Congress
toward voting a prompt resolution of ratification or
disapproval of the president's troop commitment. Thus, the
resolution has largely failed to promote just the dialogue and
cooperation it was designed to produce. 152
As the twenty-first century proceeds, it seems increasingly
likely that our domestic war powers law will become obsolescent
152. KOH, supra note 5, at 190-91 (emphasis added).
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to deal with modern war powers questions of all kinds, not just
humanitarian interventions. Four decades after its enactment, the
War Powers Resolution seems largely exhausted. To its credit, it
has forced presidents to report-albeit tersely-on foreign
deployments and to keep their interventions short. But apart from
that, it has done little to bring about what its "required
withdrawal deadline" was intended to do-namely, force
meaningful interbranch dialogue between the President and
Congress about when the United States should engage in
sustained uses of force.
As time goes by, large-scale interventions of the Vietnam- or
Iraq Desert Storm-kind will become increasingly rare. Whether in
humanitarian situations or not, armed conflict will increasingly be
conducted not by massive air strike or sustained ground invasion,
but rather, by the sporadic use of drones, special operations, and
cyberspace. None of these three forms of use of force are clearly
regulated by existing U.S. domestic law, whether the "Declare
War" Clause of the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution. We
should accept the bitter truth that the War Powers Resolution has
become increasingly obsolete, and not just in humanitarian crises.
Once again, its main regulatory device-a blunt, durational limit
of ambiguous applicability-proves too unnuanced to force a
thoughtful interbranch dialogue about how to deal sensitively with
either the rapidly evolving goals or tools of modern warfare.
If Congress disagrees with any particular proposed
humanitarian intervention, it plainly has all the political tools
available to make its views clear. If the President were to initiate
a particular humanitarian action, and some period of time later,
one or more houses of Congress were to vote a simple resolution
disapproving any proposed humanitarian intervention, ex ante or
ex post, their action would put the President into Category Three
of Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, i.e., at its "lowest ebb."153 That move would
place the burden back on the President to decide how critical he
believes that intervention is, and how much of it he can credibly
execute under his Article II Commander-in-Chief authorities. But
such political games of chicken are not the same as meaningful
interbranch dialogue. And as a political matter, any kind of
bicameral up-or-down vote regarding authorization of the use of
force remains something that the current Congress has proven
itself most unlikely to do.




How to fix this situation? Obviously, the best approach would
be legislative reform. The first-best option would be general reform
of the War Powers Resolution, something that I and others urged
more than a quarter-century ago.154 To address the use of force for
humanitarian intervention more specifically, a second possibility
would be a statutory amendment of the War Powers Resolution
narrowly exempting from the durational limits of the statute the
rare case of humanitarian intervention that meets the
international law test above.
A third possible reform idea would focus less on substance
than on process: as in the trade area,155 if the President proposed
to commit U.S. armed forces in a particular case for humanitarian
purposes, he could simultaneously have a bill introduced in
Congress under expedited "fast track" legislative procedures that
would require Congress to vote a joint resolution of approval or
disapproval of the action within, say, ninety days, in effect forcing
Congress to approve or disapprove any particular humanitarian
intervention by action, not merely by silence. Yet a fourth
possibility would be for the President and Congress in effect to
resurrect a constitutional, jointly authorized "legislative veto."
The two branches would agree to a joint resolution that amends
the War Powers Resolution so that Congress authorizes the
President to carry on any particular humanitarian action for, say,
one year, but states that that action shall cease upon a concurrent
resolution of the House and Senate-i.e., a bicameral vote not
subject to presidential veto-that in the joint resolution the
President has agreed ex ante to abide by.156
The obvious problem with each of these reform proposals
would be that in the current legislative environment, even modest
legislative action seems politically unobtainable. At a time when
Congress is unwilling to vote even to authorize an expanded war
against ISIL that most Members seem to support,15 7 there seems
154. See generally KOH, supra note 5, at 189-93 (proposing overarching war powers
reform as part of a new national security framework statute). For a reform bill currently
pending before Congress, see War Powers Consultation Act of 2014, S. 1939, 113th Cong.
(2014). For a now-classic proposal as to how Congress could broadly modify the War Powers
Resolution to make it more effective, see generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
155. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy,
18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992).
156. For a detailed discussion of a similar proposal, see Charles Tiefer, Can the
President and Congress Establish a Legislative Veto Mechanism for Jointly Drawing Down
a Long and Controversial War?, 6 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 131 (2012).
157. See generally Jennifer Steinhauer, A Congress That Doesn't Want to Weigh In on
War, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1Q1JMmO; Editorial, A Fearful Congress Sits
Out the War Against ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2015), http://nyti.ms/10smmGm.
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to be little or no chance that Congress would ever take up a
Humanitarian Intervention War Powers Resolution. Increasingly,
Congress sets up statutory schemes that exempt it from having to
act affirmatively to address difficult questions-not just the use of
force, but legislation on base closings, Medicare-cutting and the
like. The proliferation of these legislative structures makes clear
that these are issues that Congress simply will not force itself to
decide. As Professor Johnsen correctly notes, such "[clongressional
intransigence . . . may be relevant to prudential norms of
interbranch cooperation and weigh in favor of presidents choosing
to exercise the full extent of their authorities."15 8
That brings us to the "common law" status quo, under which
the Executive Branch seeks to intervene for less than sixty days
and tries to keep its intervention at a level below statutory
"hostilities." But suppose Congress stays silent and the mission
remains unfinished at Day Sixty? That is the issue the Clinton
Administration finessed in Kosovo and Obama's 2010 intervention
in Libya flagged. After Kosovo and Libya, could a presidential
administration in good faith take more than sixty days to use a
level of force that undeniably exceeds "hostilities" to prevent the
mass slaughter of civilians abroad?
Professor Johnsen would say no, based on a strict reading of
the WPR's text. But King v. Burwell,159 the 2015 Obamacare case,
suggests otherwise. In King, the Court decided that the words
"Exchange established by the State" could also, paradoxically,
embrace health-care exchanges that had been established by the
federal government. In upholding the statute, Chief Justice
Roberts chose not to focus solely on the statutory text, but instead
directed that "a fair reading of the legislation demands a fair
understanding of the legislative plan."160 Congress had passed the
Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to
destroy them. So if possible, the Chief Justice suggested, we should
construe the legislative enactment in a way that is consistent with
that broader legislative plan.' 6 '
By the same token, there is nothing in the legislative plan of
the War Powers Resolution to suggest that Congress's goal was to
tolerate mass civilian slaughter. Congress's main focus was to
limit creeping, open-ended wars, not to bar all uses of force that
158. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1079.
159. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
160. Id. at 2496.
161. Id. at 2492 (citing Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 545-46 (1947) (noting that "fair adjudication" requires the Court to
try to understand Congress's plan)).
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might prevent humanitarian disasters. To set the bar, Congress
placed a durational limit on those uses of American military force
that cross the line into "hostilities." But as I have noted above,
Congress deliberately left the precise meaning of "hostilities"
ambiguous. Through agreed-upon interbranch practice, that
statutory scheme has evolved over forty years to a less rigid
understanding of what the President may do and for how long. As
the four-part test set out in my Libya testimony suggested, the
legislature's main concerns were curbing open-ended military
missions, open-ended exposure of U.S. forces to foreign threats,
open-ended escalation of the number of U.S. armed forces placed
into harm's way in a foreign territory, and the uncontrolled use of
military means in open-ended armed conflicts.
We need to acknowledge that humanitarian interventions
simply were not on Congress's mind in 1973 when it "passed the
War Powers Resolution to prevent future Vietnams, undeclared
creeping wars that start and build before Congress or the public
are fully aware."1 62 A law that was adopted four decades ago to say
"no more Vietnams" does not easily translate into a statute that
today says "let's stop genocides, but only if it takes less than sixty
days." It makes little sense, as the Libya war powers debate
showed, simply to focus on one word-"hostilities"-as opposed to
assessing the entire legislative plan of the War Powers
Resolution. 63 And it makes even less sense to act as if the
legislative term "hostilities" was so clearly defined that it requires
stopping even those constrained uses of force for humanitarian
purposes that after sixty days may be close to succeeding.
The parallel to the international law debate should be clear.
An absolutist would argue that the text of the Resolution-which
says that troops must be withdrawn after sixty days (or in certain
circumstances ninety days)-admits of absolutely no exceptions
whatsoever. But suppose Houston enacted a statute that says
unequivocally, "The mayor shall keep school open every day."
Suppose further that a hurricane renders all roads impassable,
and the mayor orders all schools closed, reading the statute under
these exigent circumstances to mean: "The mayor shall keep
162. KOH, supra note 5, at 39.
163. I agree with Professor Johnsen that because "some of the sponsors ... could not
agree, even after the fact, about when hostilities began in Vietnam," that the WPR's
"drafters ... may have left the term ["hostilities"] undefined simply because they did not
agree about its scope." Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1097-98. It follows, as I argued in my
Libya testimony, that interbranch practice should then determine whether "hostilities"
were in fact occurring on Day Sixty. In the Libyan case, the Executive Branch said no, and
Congress as a whole stayed silent, with its key leaders publicly agreeing that no violation
of the WPR had occurred.
2016] 1023
1024 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [53:4
school open every day unless it is physically impossible to do so."
Is the mayor violating the law? Will the legislature condemn her
interpretation? That seems most unlikely.164 After all, the
legislative plan was never to force the executive to open the school
even in life-threatening circumstances. 165 In both the
school-closing and the war powers examples, evolving factual
circumstances reveal a broader, more nuanced legislative plan. In
both cases, it seems both possible and wise to read into the text of
a statute a flexibility that better reflects the legislature's broader
plan. 166
164. In analyzing King, Judge Posner offered a similar example:
[An ordinance states "no vehicles in public parks." An ambulance driver is
ticketed for ignoring the ordinance (though its text is clearly posed at the entrance
to the park) by driving the ambulance into the park to save a person who has
fallen into a pond and is struggling. Has the ambulance driver violated the
ordinance? Yes if the ordinance is interpreted literally. But the literal
interpretation has absurd consequences. A judge is apt to say: the city council, or
other official body, that enacted the ordinance couldn't have wanted the ordinance
interpreted literally. They "meant" there to be an exception to the prohibition of
vehicles, but just forgot to write it into the ordinance. So a correct judicial
"interpretation" is that "no vehicles in public parks" means "no non-emergency
vehicles in public parks." This is the right result ... [w]hich is essentially what
happened in King v. Burwell.
Richard Posner, Comment On Professor Gluck's "Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts," 129
HARv. L. REV. F. 11, 11-12 (2015), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/voll29_Posner.pdf.
165. Cf. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 531 (2007) (opining that a
court need not construe a statute literally if doing so would produce "incongruous results").
Professor Johnsen argues that "[t]here was no hurricane or childbirth in the Libya context
that might have provided an impossibility justification" to prevent securing congressional
approval for continuation pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. Johnsen, supra note 17,
at 1102. But what my Senate testimony made clear was the Obama Administration had
already sought congressional approval for continuation. What made that request pointless
was that Congress adamantly refused to act on it, in no small part because its leadership
preferred an interpretation that the Administration was in fact acting consistently with the
War Powers Resolution. See supra note 37.
166. Professor Johnsen makes the unpersuasive 'slippery slope' argument that my
narrow claim that Congress has acquiesced in the near-term completion of several past
humanitarian interventions will breed other, much broader exceptions, e.g. a
"counterterrorism exception" to the War Powers Resolution. Perhaps the Congress that
enacted the WPR did not have 9/11 counterterrorism in mind, Johnsen, supra note 17, at
1078, but that Congress was certainly aware of the possible need to use force for
counterterrorist purposes. And with respect to counterterrorism, setting aside the political
reality that such an exemption might be one of the few exceptions to the WPR that a
majority of both Houses of the current Congress might actually support, all of our current
counterterrorism operations are authorized by authorizations for the use of military force
(AUMFs) voted by Congress. Moreover, to my knowledge, all current operations involve
either short-term special operations that plainly do not constitute "war," can be completed
easily within sixty days, or are executed in a fashion that does not meet either the WIPR's
required factual triggers or the four-part "hostilities" standard that I specified in my Libya
testimony. Nor do I anywhere claim that "the presence or absence of hostilities ... turn[s]
on the reason behind the use of military force," Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1102 (emphasis
added). To the contrary, under the four-part Libya test discussed in text, a military mission
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While seeking to distinguish King v. Burwell,167 Professor
Johnsen does not address the many parallel situations in which
Congress, the Executive, or the courts have effectively revised
strict statutory terms in light of changing societal contexts, 68 or
against the background of common law principles (such as
damages rules), constitutional law principles (such as federalism),
or principles of international law (such as jus cogens) that may
militate in favor of a less rigid textual reading over time. 169 Over
time, the accretion of such historical precedents and background
norms may support revised constructions even of absolutist
statutory text.1 7 0
In future extreme cases, we can expect all three branches to
read the legislature's acquiescence in the completion of the Kosovo
and Libyan operations-set against the backdrop of emerging
international law norms tolerant of genuine humanitarian
interventions that meet the strict international law test above-to
support relaxation of the War Powers Resolution's strict
durational limits for the limited purpose of completing the
that was more open-ended in nature, duration, or scope, or that involved a higher
magnitude of strikes, casualties, or risk of escalation plainly would constitute "hostilities"
for purposes of the WPR.
167. As Professor Gluck has noted, in providing a more flexible reading of statutory
text, the Court's reasoning in King was "not radical," but followed dozens of Court
precedents. Abbe Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress's
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 88 (2015) ("The Court
frequently invoked the concept of statutory plans in the pre-textualist era. More than 100
opinions did so, often referencing the 'comprehensive' congressional plan . . . .").
168. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014) (effectively revising
an apparently absolutist regulatory restriction in the Clean Air Act because interpreting it
literally in modern times would be absurd). The Court held that the statutory term "air
pollutant" need not always be held to include "greenhouse gases," and should be interpreted
in a context-appropriate way, because literal inclusion of the term in all cases would compel
regulation of tens of thousands of additional pollution emitters whom Congress presumably
did not intend to regulate.
169. Compare the evolving understanding of the Sherman Act in antitrust law. See
Charles S. Dameron, Note, Present at Antitrust's Creation: Consumer Welfare in the
Sherman Act's State Statutory Forerunners, 125 YALE L.J. 1072, 1075 (2016) (describing
how "[tihe Supreme Court first purported to strictly construe the Act's prohibition of'every
contract . . . in restraint of trade,' noting that 'no exception or limitation can be added
without placing in the act that which has been omitted by Congress,"' but then "later set
aside the statute's plain meaning and seized upon the statute's use of common-law
language to derive a common-law 'rule of reason' prohibiting only those agreements that
unreasonably' restrained trade" (internal citations omitted)).
170. Indeed, based on similar reasoning, Professor Johnsen praises as "a model of
rigorous analysis" OLC's 2000 reading of an appropriations bill to authorize extended
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo-despite express language in the WPR rejecting such
bills as statutory approval-because an appropriations measure had "the effect of
establishing a background principle against which to interpret later Acts of Congress" with
respect to use of force. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1098; supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
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humanitarian mission in question. To be clear, I do not think this
narrow claim of authority is either open-ended or constitutionally
based.171 Depending on the facts of an extended future
intervention, Congress or the courts could fairly conclude that the
presidential use of force had become unlawful and must cease.1 72
To paraphrase Justice Breyer in Zadvydas v. Davis, in deciding
whether this is a reasonable statutory interpretation,
"the court must ask whether the [operation] in question
exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure [the
intended outcome]. It should measure reasonableness
primarily in terms of the statute's basic purpose . . . . Thus,
if [completion] is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued [use of force] unreasonable and no longer
authorized by statute."173
Of course, such "common law" statutory interpretations can be
later overridden by authoritative legislative or judicial
pronouncement. 7 4 If, as seems likely in the near term, the Executive
applies this common-law interpretation, and Congress never
formally approves or disapproves it, it remains unclear whether the
courts would find it justiciable. Thus, under this "common law" status
quo, the key war powers questions will inevitably become predictive:
Given the military strategy announced, could the humanitarian
intervention be successfully completed within a reasonable time?
And if the President continued, would Congress likely bless the
President's decision after the fact in a legally meaningful way? If both
questions could be fairly answered "yes," applying such an
interpretation could accommodate congressional and executive
interests for the near term.
Still, we should frankly acknowledge that, as a matter of good
constitutional governance and checks and balance, this is not a
171. See Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2368-74
(2006) (rejecting the notion of an Article II "completion power" with respect, inter alia, to
the use of force abroad).
172. Professor Johnsen significantly overstates in calling my reading of the statute
"broad," "impermissible," and "sweeping." Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1075, 1088, 1097. She
elsewhere better describes my interpretation of the current statute as an effort to address
"Congress's effort to deal with its own tendency toward inaction through the sixty-day
clock." Id. at 1088. Absent new legislation or an intervening judicial decision, the narrow
result of the interpretation that I have suggested would simply be to affirm the status quo:
that Congress has generally allowed the President to lawfully complete humanitarian
interventions that have been lawfully initiated under domestic and international law, not
to "empower presidents to act unilaterally, and for indefinite periods of time." Id. at 1088.
173. Zadyydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001).
174. Cf. id. (reading an implicit time frame into a statute whose terms were silent on
the limits on detention, finding "nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly




healthy long-term solution. As Professor Pildes noted with respect
to Libya:
[T]he WPR, while an important effort on Congress'[s] part to
reclaim a role for itself over uses of military force, is
constructed in an extremely inept way, as a means of making
policy over such momentous issues. By design, the WPR
makes Congress's silence-its failure to act to take any
position one way or the other about matters like the Libya
operation-tantamount to a decision by Congress to prohibit
the United States from continu[ing] to participate in
"hostilities" that the United States has initiated. Thus,
Congress's failure to act has all the consequences, as a
practical matter, of an affirmative decision by Congress to cut
off the Libya operation, though without Congress actually
making such a decision or having to take direct responsibility,
through the act of voting, for such a decision and its ensuing
consequences. This policymaking-by-silence should certainly
give us pause as a sound structure of decision-making on
matters of such significance.17 5
For now, Congress may be able to sit on its hands, but there
seems little doubt that, left unaddressed, this problem will grow.
In future humanitarian crises, Congress will be less and less able
to express its views by silence, simply by pointing to the 1973 War
Powers Resolution. The three case studies I have reviewed show
that there are too many ambiguities in how that statute is to apply
in humanitarian intervention cases. As time goes by, Congress will
simply have to find a better way to force collective expression of its
views regarding humanitarian intervention by considered
affirmative action in specific cases, not through deliberately
ambiguous inaction.
In sum, sticking with a "common law interpretive approach"
instead of genuine legislative reform leaves us in a precarious
place for the longer term. It leaves the text of an outmoded War
Powers Resolution unchanged, but forces the President to bear the
burden of action in particular cases, waiting for Congress to
meaningfully object. Most troubling, it leaves the world wondering
whether the United States is legally empowered to take the lead
in a dire humanitarian crisis.
For the longer term, we should not simply accept an uneasy
status quo in which both the domestic and international law rules
remain murky. In both the domestic and international spheres,
the existing black-letter rules of law create an inappropriate bias
toward inaction in the face of the grossest abuses. If we wait, this
175. Pildes, supra note 77 (emphasis added).
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bi-level bias toward inaction will likely get worse. After a period of
"glasnost"-from the late 1980s until 2010, where the Russians
were prepared to cooperate on Security Council resolutions as they
did in Libya-we have now entered an uncertain period, akin to
the Cuban Missile Crisis, where we can expect the Russians to veto
resolutions that they do not perceive as serving their global
interests. As Syria and Ukraine show, that persistent veto could
dictate long-term multilateral paralysis in the face of gross
abuses.176 At the same time, under domestic law, the main
difference between now and then is Congress's willingness and
ability to take positive action: to vote legislation and to approve
wars instead of just playing politics and avoiding responsibility.
In time, these dysfunctionalities could combine to create a
toxic brew: at the domestic level, a dysfunctional Congress and a
legalistic presidency with limited tools to motivate the
constitutional order to enable American leadership, and at the
international level, a dysfunctional Security Council and legalistic
liberal nations with limited tools to motivate the international
order to head off civilian slaughter. If chronic congressional and
Security Council incapacity and passivity can license civilian
massacre based on absolutist readings of the U.N. Charter and the
War Powers Resolution, the tragic result may be too many
unchecked deaths, with the U.S. government left paralyzed on the
sidelines.
3. The Syrian Conundrum. Nowhere is our need for better
law clearer than in our current crisis in Syria, which makes vivid
why this debate is both urgent and timely. As I write, the Syrian
refugee crisis is escalating. The five-year civil war has killed
250,000, displaced 7 million, and created 5 million refugees, some
2 million of them children. 177 Europe's capacity to absorb the
refugees is at a breaking point; many borders have been closed,
and the rise of ISIL, the expansion of the conflict between the allies
176. Indeed, it was precisely to skirt a persistent Russian veto that in the past, U.N.
members have acknowledged that the Security Council does not have an exclusive
monopoly on the use of force. Instead, U.N. members have claimed the right to take military
action outside the Security Council framework by adopting the Uniting for Peace Resolution
or-as in the Cuban Missile Crisis-invoking the regional organizations language in
Chapter VIII of the Charter. Significantly, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, many
international lawyers claimed the U.S. position was flatly illegal. Yet fifty years later, it is
widely regarded as a textbook decision-making case study. See generally Koh, supra note
23.
177. See Howard Forman, Caring for 2 Million Refugee Children, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 2,
2016), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2016-02-02/caring-for
-2-million-refugee-children; Syria Crisis: Regional Overview: About the Crisis, U.N. OFF.
COORDINATION OF HUm. AFFS., http://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country
-profile/about-crisis (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
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and ISIL, and the entry (and abrupt exit) of Russia in Syria have
only made the crisis more urgent. 178 The United States has shifted
its military focus toward ISIL and away from Assad, even though
he remains the root cause of the refugee crisis. As the
humanitarian situation grows more dire, the Syrian crisis has
become suffused with R2P issues: Can U.N. bodies undertake
humanitarian relief inside Syria? May they supply arms to vetted
Syrian rebels? Can they prevent Assad's expanded use of barrel
bombs (and undiscovered chemical weapons) against civilians
from further inflaming the crisis? Perhaps most urgent, even
without a Security Council resolution, could the United States and
its NATO allies lawfully create a no-fly zone to protect a
humanitarian corridor for fleeing refugees near the Syrian-
Turkish border north of Aleppo?
While I remain deeply cautious about intervention in Syria,179
I agree with Michael Ignatieff that any nominally
"noninterventionist" position must acknowledge how much the
world is already intervening in Syria.o80 The idea that a
noninterventionist position is legally required in Syria must be
tested against the hard reality that almost everyone under the sun
is already intervening in Syria. Under these circumstances, the
nonintervention position for the West may not actually be a
pro-peace position, but rather a pro-slaughter position in which
the Western powers invoke inflexible legal rules as a reason to do
nothing.
As a former human rights policymaker, I of course concede
that targeted uses of force could backfire. But I still favor having
the "smart power" option of diplomatic intervention backed by the
lawful threat of limited military intervention, over the policy
option of doing nothing, even after a deliberate large-scale attack
on civilians. The argument above suggests that neither Article 2(4)
nor the WPR are so black and white that they clearly forbid the
178. See Matthew Dalton, Russia's Putin Holds the Cards in Europe's Crises, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/russias-putin-holds-the-cards-in-europes
-crises- 1443735923; Larry Elliot & Jill Treanor, Dutch PM Says Refugee Crisis Could Shut
Down Europe's Open Borders for Good, GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/21/dutch-pm-says-refugee-crisis-could-shut
-down-europes-open-borders-for-good.
179. As Nicholas Kristof has rightly cautioned, "Let's be humble enough to
acknowledge that we can't be sure of the answer and that Syria will be bloody whatever we
do." Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, The Right Questions on Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://nyti.ms/lOiPpfi. In Syria, for example, the shifting balance of power in the civil war,
the proliferation of questionable armed groups on both sides, the risk of mission creep, and
the uncertainty of follow-on consequences from any military strike all demand caution,
particularly if one starts from the premise, "first, do no harm."
180. See Ignatieff & Wieseltier, supra note 84; Ignatieff, supra note 151.
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President from lawfully backing his diplomacy with a threat of
force in the most dire humanitarian crises.18 1 As cease-fire
discussions proceed, diplomatic intervention backed by a credible
threat of force seems far more likely to bring peace in Syria than
a do-nothing, nominally "pro-peace" noninterventionist position in
Syria that effectively licenses continued civilian slaughter and
refugee crises.
With respect to humanitarian intervention, the question
raised under both domestic and international law is whether
ambiguous legal rules should be interpreted to dictate a systemic
bias for inaction at a time when far more assertive preventive
action may be indicated. A bi-level bias toward inaction can only
spawn more cases of what I once called "The Haiti Paradigm in
U.S. Human Rights Policy," of which the Syrian crisis is only the
latest example.1 82
Some charge that the Syria crisis presents a binary choice
between following law or protecting human rights. 183 But as the
most powerful nation in the international legal order, the United
States sometimes acts as a law-taker, sometimes as a law-breaker,
and sometimes as a law-maker. I simply suggest that the
continuing gravity of the Syria situation calls for the United States
181. As noted above, the threat of force catalyzed the diplomatic removal of Syrian
chemical weapons. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. Professor Johnsen and I
both agree that "[a]t a time when our daily news includes a global refugee crisis and
terrorist threats, the case for meaningful U.S. leadership and engagement is compelling."
Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1070. We further agree that "[w]e should take special care not
to empower presidents to respond to humanitarian crises with military force without
congressional authorization in ways that would diminish the guiding force of the rule of
law." Id. at 1103. Where we disagree is that I think we as lawyers can propose better rules
of domestic and international law. History suggests that completing a Kosovo-style
intervention in more than sixty days need not seriously "harm rule-of-law values." Id. To
the contrary, neither Congress nor the Executive have equated the "rule of law" with an
inflexible sixty-day clock in cases where the President has sought lawfully to finish what
he lawfully started. Of course, if that residual authority is abused, all three branches have
the lawful tools available to them to check it.
182. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights
Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994). My thesis there was that when a global crisis arises, the
world too often under-responds to the root causes. As a matter of human rights policy in
Syria, for example, the time for more action was earlier not later. But when both the
multilateral system and the U.S. government under-responded, the failure to address root
causes in a timely fashion led to an overpowering refugee crisis that now swamps Europe,
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. The irony is that the policy reaction in both Europe and the
United States will now likely be directed against the refugees, not the root causes of the
refugee crisis. And if Congress and the courts now legalize the harsh response to the
refugees, that will lead to a perversely upside-down human rights policy: one that is too
soft on the human rights abusers and too harsh on the innocents who are fleeing from those
abusers.
183. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 148.
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to explore more thoroughly the third option. 84 Nor do I agree that
my approach focuses too much "on human rights promotion over
the ban on force."185 These goals can be mutually reinforcing.
There is no inevitable battle between human rights and the rule
of law. In carefully limited circumstances, carefully drawn legal
rules can protect human rights without undermining a robust
general prohibition against force.
Surely we must proceed cautiously to ensure that the road to
hell is not paved with good intentions. But is the solution never to
explore that pathway, or to proceed down that road carefully in
hopes that if we do so wisely, we might be able to make things
better in the long run? Plainly, intervention does not always (or
even often) make things better. But neither does a blanket posture
of "nonintervention even in the face of the grossest abuse" always
lead to the optimal long-term outcome.
These delicate situations demand a thoughtful examination of
all of our lawful policy options. I agree with Professor Johnsen that
"[wie must not allow short-term challenges, even as compelling as
humanitarian crises and terrorism, to blind us to the long-term
costs of undermining rule-of-law values."18 6 But neither should we
pretend that the domestic and international law rules that govern
this situation are so determinate that "rule-of-law values" ban the
very policy options that may be necessary to spur the preventive
diplomacy that might save lives.
IV. CONCLUSION
In closing, the relationship between humanitarian
intervention and the war powers presents a tough problem, which
is precisely why I have returned to Houston.
This Lecture has reviewed three recent episodes of
humanitarian intervention. My broader point is that we should not
go through another such searing episode without reexamining the
184. If a customary legal norm "can come into existence (i.e. become authoritative) only
by virtue of the necessarily erroneous belief that it is already in existence (i.e.
authoritative)," J.M. Finnis, Authority, in AUTHORITY 174, 180 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990), it is
unclear how a new customary norm can ever come into existence under a system of opinio
juris. Cf. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-56,
66-72 (1971) (discussing this "circularity" concern). Thus, as the Cuban Missile Crisis
example shows, an affirmative effort by the United States and its key allies to move R2P
from an extralegal to a customary legal norm will almost by necessity require at the outset
what to the legal purist will seem an aggressive, forward-leaning claim of legality that, if
repeated enough times by enough actors thereafter, will come to seem as more widely
accepted and less disruptive to the existing legal order. I am grateful to David Pozen for
this observation.
185. Kaye, supra note 148.
186. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1112.
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law we apply. Everyone who has worked in government knows
that arguing for an evolution in the law is a decision with which
both policymakers and government lawyers must grapple. Asking
policy-makers to make a false choice between action and legality
sends them the wrong message: that when the law gets hard, or
stands in the way of urgent action, lawyers are incapable of
developing sound legal arguments that can achieve better policy
results.
By stating a proposed legal test for R2P, this Frankel
Lecture has sought to further my overall aims: promoting the
progressive development of and internalization of international
law, the positive face of American exceptionalism, the use of
"international law as smart power," and the core principles of
the National Security Constitution. I believe that we can and
must clarify the international and domestic legal rules
governing the use of humanitarian intervention. As a matter of
international law, we need to clarify when humanitarian
intervention is or is not lawful. As a matter of domestic law, we
need to develop a war powers approach to humanitarian
intervention that is consistent with a "shared power" vision of
constitutional checks and balances and makes more explicit
what kinds of humanitarian interventions Congress will or will
not accept and for how long.
Professor Johnsen calls my approach here "striking for its
emphasis on the role of law, not as a vehicle to constrain
overreaching presidents who would do harm, but as an
impediment to well-meaning presidents who would do good."' 87
But I have always advocated a vision of a "strong presidency
within a strong constitutional system" 88 that sees-in Professor
Johnsen's words-the "law powerfully affect[ing] presidents and
public policy in both of these ways": constraining and authorizing.
What I have argued here follows from my suggestion more than a
quarter of a century ago that
what history reveals is that we need a better process for
incrementally amending the National Security Constitution
that remains faithful to its original concept, yet flexible
enough to respond to fast-moving times. . . . Given the
difficulties of obtaining formal constitutional amendment,
our more modest goal should not be to freeze any particular
allocation of institutional power into a statute, but rather, to
create a dynamic legal process that will allow our
187. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1068.
188. Harold Hongju Koh, War and Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
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postimperial National Security Constitution to evolve over
time. 189
Here, such a dynamic legal process presents the challenge to
do creative lawyering, by which I mean the law must keep
responding to human needs. Lawyers have a special responsibility
to respond if the law-as it currently stands-does not adequately
serve human purposes in the twenty-first century. As both
international and domestic lawyers, our responsibility should not
be simply to repeat that "a rule is a rule is a rule," particularly
when-as a matter of both domestic and international law-those
"rules" are not nearly as absolutist as some might suggest.
U.S. paralysis at both the international and domestic levels
impairs America's capacity for global leadership, or what I earlier
called "positive American exceptionalism." A "smart power"
approach to international diplomacy suggests that a limited use or
threat of force should be available to back up multilateral
diplomacy in those rare situations where the rigorous legal
conditions sketched above are met.
The continuing agony of Syria shows vividly that this is not
just an academic nor historical debate. While crucial Syrian
diplomacy is unfolding in Geneva, we should not consider this
matter closed, but rather, should look even harder for better legal
answers. Here, a better answer would clearly be one that would
give due respect to territorial sovereignty, without enabling the
further deliberate slaughter of innocent civilians with illegal
weapons. If international law or the War Powers Resolution
cannot adequately balance the moral imperatives presented by
today's conflicts, they should be updated.
Others will surely disagree with my tests for both war powers
and humanitarian intervention, but my main goal has been to
open debate, not to end it. If my tests are not now the law, why
shouldn't they be? As Louis Henkin prophetically wrote shortly
after Kosovo, "Is it better [for us] to leave the law alone, . . . turning
a blind eye (and a deaf ear) to violations that had . . . moral
justification? Or should [these incidents] move us to push the law
along,... closer to what [it] ought to be?"190
189. KOH, supra note 5, at 227.
190. Louis Henkin, Commentary, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention,"
93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 824, 827 (1999).
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